In my blog on 20 June, 2025, I had argued that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) needs to review its rules on notification obligations to cater to the situation arising from the US tariff hikes, perhaps by bringing out another revision of the rules on notification obligations, whereby the Member hiking tariffs must be required to identify the specific permissive provision of the WTO agreements that enables it to take such an action. It appears that the WTO Members collectively think so, and are taking baby steps towards such a revision.

In the meeting of the Council on Trade in Goods (CTG) of the WTO held on 7-8 July, 2025, they took a decision^[1] to introduce a new standing item on the agenda of future CTG meetings, entitled "Reports on Resolution of Trade Concerns". Under this agenda item, Members will be invited to report on previously raised trade concerns for which a resolution has been reached.  On its part the WTO Secretariat will maintain a categorized record of all trade concerns raised in CTG, where concerns for which information has been received will be listed as either resolved or as partially resolved. Further, when the Chair of the CTG, Ambassador Gustavo Nerio Lunazzi (Argentina), reported on his consultations with WTO Members on improving the functioning of the CTG, several Members proposed improving transparency through better use of digital tools, more effective notification processes and regular reporting on thematic sessions.

It is worth noting that similar reporting mechanisms in other WTO Committees, such as the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) and the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee), have provided an effective means for Members to track and demonstrate the resolution of Specific Trade Concerns raised in those bodies. As mentioned in my blog last month, however, there is no such mechanism for WTO Members to notify tariff hikes that take their customs duties beyond the rates bound by them in the WTO. While it is rare for WTO Members to breach their tariff bindings, the tariff hikes by the United States this year fall in this category.

Hence the most noteworthy discussion in the CTG last week was on the notifications by the European Union, India, Japan and the United Kingdom proposing to suspend concessions under Article 8.2 of the WTO's Agreement on Safeguards in response to US tariff measures. The reason these Members chose to justify their proposed action under the Agreement on Safeguards is that if a WTO Member takes such a trade remedy, the affected Members, through a procedure detailed in that Agreement, are allowed to suspend substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under the WTO agreements corresponding to the adverse effect caused by the safeguard measure. As was expected, rather than promising to notify its measure and seeking consultations with those wishing to rebalance the trade concessions agreed through negotiations, the United States questioned the proposed action by India and others as their measure was taken as a national security measure (rather than a safeguard measure} under Section 232 of its Trade Expansion Act, 1962,as their President determined that tariffs are necessary to adjust imports that threaten to impair the national security of the United States. Unfortunately, while pointing to the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards that require WTO Members to consult before suspending concessions, the United States also closed doors for any consultations, as seen in the last paragraph of its response to India, stating that “The United States will not discuss the Section 232 tariffs under the Agreement on Safeguards as we do not view the tariffs as a safeguard measure”.^[2]

This is particularly problematic as the United States has been batting for compensatory action by the affected WTO members in cases of measures taken by another Member on account of essential security interests. In one of its submissions to the WTO, the United States specifically agreed, inter alia that “the complaining party Member may suspend the application of tariff concessions at the level equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment determined by (an) Arbitrator”.^[3] It is a puzzle how such a determination through arbitration can be secured by a WTO Member adversely affected by a United States measure taken to protect its essential security interests when the United States does not in the first place notify the WTO about the measure and the specific WTO provision under which it has been taken, in this case Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Hence, a revision of the provisions relating to notification obligations is required to include an obligation to notify any tariff hikes beyond the bound tariffs.

In the meanwhile, other trade concerns continued to be discussed in the CTG irrespective of whether they were notified by the Member taking the measure or not; thirty-six specific trade concerns were discussed, including for the first time a concern raised by Australia regarding India's certification process under the Cotton Bales (Quality Control) Order 2023, which came into effect on August 27 2024, and aims to ensure the quality and standardization of cotton bales by requiring them to meet specific quality parameters and undergo testing and certification by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). There have been several other Quality Control Orders (QCOs) issued by India in recent years, and are likely to find mention in the future meetings of the CTG. These QCOs are very much in consonance with India’s obligations under the WTO agreements, and therefore, it will serve India well, if not already done, to notify them under the notification obligations prescribed in the respective agreements (such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade).