

# Policy Issues Related to WTO Reform Before the 14th Ministerial Conference of the WTO

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*Recent global developments show a major disregard for inclusive and predictable rules-based systems. The global comity of nations has a valuable multilateral trading system, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which incorporates a number of important interlinked operational principles (see Table 1 below). The most important underlying principles for WTO are those which enable inclusiveness, fairness, special and differential treatment (S&DT), and predictability of the system.*

**Table 1: WTO' Principles and Their Impact on Operations of the Trading System**

WTO Principles	Principles Operate Through, or Have an Impact On:
Non-discrimination	MFN, National Treatment, Stability and Predictability
Fair	Development and S&DT, Inclusion
Inclusiveness	MFN, National Treatment, Consensus
Consensus-based	Inclusion
Rules-based	Stability and Predictability
Open	Creating Trade Opportunities
Transparency	Clarity of the Operational System and Predictability of the Operational Conditions
Predictability	Efficiency and Effectiveness of the System, Enabling Larger Business Opportunities
Dispute Settlement	Rule based stability and predictability

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, [https://www.wto.org/english/theWTO\\_e/whatis\\_e/tif\\_e/org1\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm)

<sup>2</sup> Article IX.1 states inter alia that: “Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting.”

<sup>3</sup> The Indian submission on “Joint Statement Initiatives” in document WT/GC/W/819 of 19 February 2021 provides a compilation of these legal requirements.

<sup>4</sup> See for example, [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/publications\\_e/ai17\\_e/gatt1994\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_e.htm). See also, [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/publications\\_e/ai17\\_e/wto\\_agree\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/wto_agree_e.htm)

<sup>5</sup> Article IX.1 of the Marrakesh Agreement states that: “Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement”. The key phrase in this context is “unless otherwise provided”.

The ongoing discussions on WTO Reform are most crucial because there are some proposals which aim to significantly dilute/ change the fundamental operational system of WTO, including MFN, consensus-based decision making, and S&D. These changes would adversely impact the operational conditions of the WTO system, in particular those shown in bold text in the second column of Table 1. This policy brief suggests a way forward which addresses some of these concerns without dismantling the architecture in the WTO that sustains these operational principles.

Section 1 of this paper explains three key principles of WTO and their positive contribution to the multilateral trading system. Section 2 discusses the changes suggested by the current submissions on reform and how they will adversely impact the positive attributes of the WTO regime. Section 3 suggests policy options and perspectives that could help retain the positive attributes of the WTO system.

## Section 1. Key WTO Principles and Their Contribution

WTO’s foundational principles include:

- a. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle.
- b. Consensus-based decision-making.
- c. Special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries, including least developed countries.

### (1.a) The Crucial Role of These Foundational Principles

Each of these three principles results in inclusiveness, fairness and predictability of the WTO system.

The importance of inclusiveness is shown for instance in the fact that the

WTO is repeatedly emphasized by its members as being a “member-driven consensus-based organization”.<sup>1</sup> The significance of inclusiveness is evident from the “one member one vote” that is specified under Article IX.1 of the Marrakesh Agreement. Thus, the participation and view of each member is significant for decision-making and operation of the WTO.

**(1.a.i)** MFN by definition provides for inclusion of all members in any agreement. This principle is considered so fundamental that any amendment of the current MFN provisions can take place “only upon acceptance by all Members” (Article X.2 of the Marrakesh Agreement).

**(1.a.ii)** Similarly, consensus by its very concept provides a basis for inclusiveness. Article IX.1 of the Marrakesh Agreement states that: “The WTO shall continue the practice of decision making by consensus followed under GATT 1947”. The footnote at the end of this sentence explains the meaning of the term “consensus” as follows: “The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.”

### (1.a.iii) The Objective of Development and S&DT

These objectives are emphasised in the chapeau of the Marrakesh Agreement, which states in this regard:

*“Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in*

*international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development*". (Emphasis added)

The submissions on WTO reform show the fundamental importance of a need to understand the provisions in the Marrakesh Agreement on decision-making and amendments.

### **(1.b) Decision-Making Criteria in the Marrakesh Agreement**

The practice in WTO has been to make decisions based on consensus. To the extent that consensus is not achieved, there is a provision for voting (with each members having one vote).<sup>2</sup> Traditionally, decisions have been taken in the WTO by consensus; members have never resorted to voting. Nevertheless, the provision exists in the statute.

It is important to note that not all issues are given similar significance under the voting system.

### **(1.c) Criteria for Decisions/ Amendment Regarding the Provisions of the WTO Agreement.<sup>3</sup>**

When WTO members wish to decide on, or amend, the current legal provisions of the WTO, they have to follow the requirements specified in the Marrakesh Agreement.

The legal content of MFN is specified in the specific WTO provisions themselves, for example in Article I of GATT 1947. The legal content of the provisions on MFN is clear, and no interpretation would be required as such.<sup>4</sup> Thus the assessment of the content of MFN is not a matter of decision-making. To change the content of the practice of MFN would require an amendment in the legal provision itself. For this, the relevant provisions are provided in Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement.

"Consensus" has been clearly defined in the Marrakesh Agreement. Any change in that definition would require an amendment of the provision.

**Voting:** The Marrakesh Agreement allows for voting at a Ministerial Conference (MC) or the General Council (GC) of the WTO by a majority of the votes cast in the situation "where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus".<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, MC/GC can adopt an authoritative interpretation of treaty terms in the WTO agreements by a three-fourth majority, but not in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in Article X.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the legal content of a provision cannot be changed through an authoritative interpretation as that would require an amendment of the provision concerned.

Therefore, the criteria for decision-making and amendments need to be kept in mind when analysing the proposals for WTO reforms. A summary of these provisions is given below.

## **Section 2. Decision-Making: Further Details**

If decision is not possible through consensus, then voting can be resorted to and the decisions can be adopted as follows:

### **a. Three-Fourths Majority of the members**

- i. "The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three fourths majority of the Members".
- ii. For "request of a waiver ... any decision to grant a waiver shall be taken by three fourths of the Members".

### **b. Other decisions, by a majority of the votes cast**

<sup>6</sup> Article IX;2 states that: "This paragraph shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in Article X".

<sup>7</sup> WTO Document JOB/GC/469 dated 5th November 2025. The Report was made on 4th November 2025.

<sup>8</sup> For Brazil's proposal, see WTO document JOB/AG/271, dated 5th December 2025.

<sup>9</sup> The term "plurilateral agreement" used here is wider than in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Here the term refers to agreements for which the membership is less than the full membership of the WTO. Article II.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement specifies this term as follows: The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members."

<sup>10</sup> MPIA is an interim arrangement for settling disputes at the appeal stage now-a-days when the Appellate Body of the WTO is not functional. There are currently 57 WTO members who have agreed to access MPIA procedures for appeal arbitration, counting all European Union members as separate WTO members.

<sup>11</sup> This concept is mentioned in Article IX.3 and 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.

<sup>12</sup> Paragraph 4 in the Annex of the document available at: [https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/minist\\_e/min96\\_e/16.pdf](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/16.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> The phrase in Article X.3 is: “Amendments ... of a nature that would alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it.”

<sup>14</sup> Paragraph 3.2 of WTO document INF/ECOM/19, dated 24th April 2019.

**c. Decisions under Annex 4 Agreements: “Decisions under a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, including any decisions on interpretations and waivers, shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement”.**

### Section 3. Amendments

**a. Amendments that require agreement by All members:**

- i. Amendment of Provisions on Decision-Making, i.e., Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, and
- ii. MFN.

**b. Amendments that require Consensus:**

- i. Members can add an agreement to Annex 4 exclusively by Consensus.

**c. Amendments that require agreement by Two-Thirds Majority of members:**

Other than the exceptions, amendments of provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and those of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1A and 1C which would alter the rights and obligations of the members take effect for members voting in favour upon acceptance by two-thirds of the total members.

Agreement of All WTO members is required to amend MFN and the provisions on criteria for decision-making under Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement.

It is important to keep these requirements in mind because some

of the WTO reform proposals aim to amend certain provisions that encompass foundational principles of WTO.

Further, if voting becomes the norm for decision-making, there will be an adverse impact on predictability of the multilateral trading system.

### Section 4. Some Current Proposals on WTO Reform That Seek Changes in Foundational Principles

The November 2025 report of the Facilitator for WTO Reform<sup>7</sup> shows that members have a wide range of views on each issue.

Two points are noteworthy in the context of the Facilitator’s report. One that it does not cover all issues emphasized by members, such as public stockholding by India and several points emphasized by Brazil’s proposal on agriculture policy reform.<sup>8</sup> Two, some members such as the US and EU seek major reforms in the above-mentioned foundational principles, particularly relating to MFN, consensus, S&DT, and plurilateral agreements. Dilution of the present provisions relating to these areas would adversely affect inclusiveness, fairness and predictability of the WTO system.

The pressure to amend consensus and MFN is primarily in order to achieve agreements that involve not the full membership of WTO (hence forth

**Table 2. Different types of Agreements under the WTO- Application of MFN and Consensus**

Requirement of:	All WTO Members are signatories	All WTO Members are not signatories	
		Annex 4 Agreements	Others
MFN	Yes	No	Yes
Consensus	Yes	Consensus required to get into Annex 4	Yes

“NFM” agreements). These agreements would be easier to conclude if consensus and MFN are not required. Within NFM agreements, some would be those that their members want to place in Annex 4 (see Table 2 below).

There are two kinds of situations with respect to MFN. One, MFN rights under the agreements with less than full membership of the WTO (henceforth “plurilateral agreements”)<sup>9</sup> accrue to their members only, i.e., MFN does not apply in relation to the non-members. These plurilateral agreements are thus “closed plurilateral agreements”. Conversely, there are plurilateral agreements where MFN applies to non-members as well, e.g., ITA.

Placing the plurilateral agreements in Annex 4 exclusively requires consensus (Article X.9 of the Marrakesh Agreement). Doing away with consensus and MFN would in effect make all NFM agreements into “Annex 4 plurilateral agreements”.

Once the NFM agreements become a part of Annex 4, its members may make amendments without approaching the rest of the membership of the WTO for consent, even if the amendments change the balance of rights and obligations among members and non-members of the plurilateral agreement. This anomaly needs to be addressed. The Marrakesh Agreement specifically emphasizes such situations in Article X.3 and X.4. For

example, Article X.4 states: “Amendments to provisions of this Agreement or of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1A and 1C, other than those listed in paragraphs 2 and 6, of a nature that would not alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for all Members upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members.” (Emphasis added)

MFN and consensus provide a basis for inclusiveness, fairness and predictability. Thus, dilution of either would adversely affect these attributes of the WTO system. Closed plurilateral agreements would lead to unpredictability and the “spaghetti bowl” effect of different plurilateral agreements would be significantly multiplied (see Table 3 below).

Table 3 illustrates the complications and unpredictability with only two plurilateral agreements of the type proposed by the US, i.e., closed plurilaterals. The Table considers two options for each of the two plurilateral agreements, one where the members are parties to the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)<sup>10</sup>, and the other where they are not. Even with only two plurilaterals, there would be lack of predictability about the impact and implications of the plurilateral agreements because each would have a different membership. The adverse systemic effect would be much more with

<sup>15</sup> Examples of de-minimis are in Articles 5.8 of the Agreement on Anti-Dumping and Article 27.10(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Yet another example is the solution expressed at the product level in Articles 27.5 and 27.6 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

<sup>16</sup> See, [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/serv\\_e/telecom\\_e/tel23\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm)

<sup>17</sup> See for example the paper at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1032484](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032484) especially the Table on page 31.

<sup>18</sup> A similar differentiation among developing economies was also carried out in the Chairs draft text for NAMA.

<sup>19</sup> For the issue of Green Box, see page 3 of Brazil’s submission in WTO document JOB/AG/271, dated 5th December 2025.

**Table 3. Different Categories of Results with Two Closed Plurilateral Agreements in the WTO**

	Members of the Appeal Process	Those Not Member of the Appeal Process
Members of Plurilateral Agreement “Y”	Track 1	Track 2
Members of Plurilateral Agreement “Z”	Track 3	Track 4
Non-Members of Plurilateral “Y”	Track 5	Track 6
Non-Members of Plurilateral “Z”	Track 7	Track 8

a larger number of closed plurilateral agreements.

Therefore, if predictability is valued, then predictability must be maintained also through the disciplines of new plurilateral agreements in the multilateral trading system. Similar concerns arise with respect to inclusiveness and fairness of the WTO system.

## Section 5. Policy Approach

### (5.a) The Framework

The suggested policy approach covers certain linked initiatives and emphasises four important components.

- i. For any member to constructively move ahead in the WTO context, close co-ordination and engagement with other members would be required.
- ii. Inclusiveness, fairness and predictability of the WTO system are very important and ideally solutions should be found without diluting them. If that is not possible then any amendment should ensure the smallest possible change in the operation of these principles without undermining the principles themselves.
- iii. In this process, WTO members should consider prior experiences, particularly for less than full membership agreements such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA).
- iv. To the extent any amendments are required, they must be according to the existing criteria specified in Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement.

#### **Close Coordination and Consultations:**

Since members have a range of views on specific issues, the first task should be to connect with those with similar views and others whose reasoning and positions on an issue is similar or close. Together with this group, it would be useful to identify and develop the substantive reasons why focusing on the common

position is required for maintaining a well-functioning trading system that is based on inclusiveness, fairness and predictability.

Second, consider the concerns of others and assess whether their objectives could be achieved without compromising the WTO's norms that lead to the desirable attributes of inclusiveness, fairness and predictability. This would require discussions with these other members.

After detailed examination, if no solution would be available that addresses the divergent concerns, the next stage would be to examine the relative costs and benefits of maintaining the optimum set of principles as well as the possibility of achieving the desired objectives through small, disciplined move away from the current optimum situation.

This assessment would show, *inter alia*, two different types of results:

- i. Changes that would result in major or significant systemic impact on the WTO regime.
- ii. Changes that are likely to have a relatively small systemic change in the WTO regime.

The aim must be to identify the second category of these changes, *i.e.*, option (ii) above. It would be crucial to identify the smallest move away from desired principles that lead to inclusion, fairness and predictability of the multilateral trading system.

The assessment needs to bear in mind two significant concerns.

- a. WTO members which are successful in negotiating trade agreements that could be reached only with less than full membership, may be concerned about "free riders" when MFN is applied. A "free rider" would be a non-member of the agreement who would get the benefits of the

agreement due to MFN but not be subject to obligation because of non-membership.

- b. The non-members would be concerned that the new agreement with non-full membership or its subsequent amendments by the members of the plurilateral agreement may have a systemic impact, “of a nature that would alter the rights and obligations of the Members.”<sup>11</sup>

**Solutions must be found to address both these concerns. The experience of ITA provides some important lessons.**

#### **(5.b). The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) as an Example**

The ITA was the initial “*non full membership*” agreement under the WTO. This agreement provided MFN and its decisions were based on consensus. A threshold level for critical mass was decided for the agreement being implemented. The specific decision regarding ITA was: “*Participants will implement the actions foreseen in the Declaration provided that participants representing approximately 90 per cent of world trade in information technology products have by then notified their acceptance, and provided that the staging has been agreed to the participants’ satisfaction.*”<sup>12</sup> (Emphasis added)

Using lessons from this experience, the options to be examined would be in terms of threshold levels for “critical mass” while maintaining consensus and MFN.

In addition to this aspect, there is one other crucial concern that would need to be met. This relates to preservation of existing WTO rights and obligations of non-members when a new NFM or plurilateral agreement is implemented. It is possible that the existing WTO right of non-members may be adversely affected by the new NFM agreement.

An indication of such a situation is provided in Article X.3 and X.4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.<sup>13</sup> In this regard, it is important to keep in mind the concern expressed by China in the context of e-commerce negotiations. It stated that: “Members should define the trade-related aspects of electronic commerce, electronic transmission, etc., and clarify the relationship between future electronic commerce rules and the existing WTO Agreements”<sup>14</sup>

Thus, it is important to get a solution that addresses both the preservation of WTO rights and obligations of non-members and an acceptable level of critical mass for members of the agreement.

**(5.c) Consensus:** If consensus is not achieved, then it would be useful to explicitly discuss objective reasons why certain countries do not agree with the consensus. Based on this assessment, efforts would be required to address the relevant concerns.

If no extent of effort provides a basis for a solution without dilution of MFN, then the only option would be to rely on Article X for amendments. Under Article X.2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, any amendment in MFN requires agreement by all members. To the extent that this is not feasible, the options discussed below may be useful to provide a solution.

**(5.d) MFN:** The concern with MFN arises due to a need to address the “free rider” problem. Three different options could be considered for addressing this concern.

First is to consider whether the free rider problem is likely to arise in practice. This would depend on the issue covered by the plurilateral agreement. Non-MFN as a solution to the free rider concern may

be more valid, for example, when the plurilateral covers MFN tariffs such as in the case of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which incidentally did not have a non-MFN result. It may be less relevant for plurilaterals that cover regulatory policies.

Second is to consider a “de minimis” level under which a specified market share threshold could be considered relevant to determine whether or not non-membership of a member creates a “free rider” concern.<sup>15</sup>

Third would be a variant of the concept underlying the Reference Paper on Telecommunications (henceforth “Reference Paper”).<sup>16</sup> The Reference Paper specified certain regulatory principles, and WTO members were allowed to voluntarily choose any, all or none of these regulatory principles as their obligations. In certain cases, a variant of this could be a basis for finding solutions to the free rider concern as well.

### **(5.e) Development and S&DT**

Development-related issues include S&DT as well as other concerns.

Regarding S&DT, three important points are particularly relevant. One, S&DT for LDCs is not questioned in the proposals. Two, the view of both the US and EU is that S&DT should be time-bound and developing country members (including LDCs) should transition to the regular WTO disciplines that apply without S&DT. Three, the developing countries that are eligible for S&DT should be determined based on objective criteria.

In addition to above, the EU proposal includes the suggestion that lessons be drawn from the Trade Facilitation Agreement, linking implementation with assistance.

Evidence from a previous context suggests that a solution on distinguishing among developing countries for S&DT is likely to emerge during the negotiations themselves rather than be determined a priori. It is significant that the Chair’s draft texts under the Doha Round specified varying levels of S&DT for different categories of developing countries.<sup>17</sup> These categories evolved during the negotiations and would likely do so again. Thus, there may not be a need to decide in advance on differentiation among developing economies for S&DT.<sup>18</sup> This is particularly relevant because of the difficulty faced in earlier discussions on determining objective criteria for S&DT.

### **(5.f) Transparency and Notification**

All members want to improve transparency. However, there are different views on how to ensure that notification requirements are met. The proposals combine technical support and penalties. In this regard, the following text from the Facilitator’s report is worth keeping in mind:

*“Others also pointed out that improving compliance with notification obligations was an area where progress could be made. Members should fulfil obligations while accounting for differing capacities. In this regard, they suggested:*

- Ensuring notifications are complete and timely, without penalizing developing or LDC Members;
- Introducing graduated transparency measures, such as extended timelines, improved templates, and enhanced technical assistance;
- Establishing guidelines to reflect all Members’ interests in decision-making and meetings.” (Paragraph 4.17 of the Facilitator’s November 2025 Report; emphasis added)

### **(5.g) Other Issues**

There are number of other concerns, such as the issue of essential security raised by the US, a concept of reciprocal liberalization introduced by the EU, and a felt need for more detailed and wider consideration of agriculture related issues. The last issue would include public stockholding and addressing the concerns arising due to the Green Box subsidies.<sup>19</sup>

Regarding the first two issues mentioned above, i.e., essential security, and reciprocal liberalization, a closer evaluation suggests that the current understanding is not adequate to reach robust solutions. For the other abovementioned issues, considerable discussion shows that it is important to give more focus and seek solutions to the concerns.

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"WTO reforms were being discussed at an ironic time, when the world appeared to be giving up on rules-based frameworks. Any discourse on the subject detached from political-economic realities would be unrealistic and unreliable."

**-Mr. Rajeev Kher**, Former Commerce Secretary and Distinguished Fellow, RIS



"If the WTO Members were to agree to erosion of consensus, developing countries like India would be increasingly marginalised, and that plurilaterals would open a “Pandora’s box”. There is a need to build a very strong coalition on S&DT, grounded in per-capita indices and multidimensional poverty calculations."

**-Mr. Jayant Dasgupta**, Former Ambassador of India to the WTO and Member, Governing Council, RIS



"Although ‘consensus’ is a fundamental principle of the multilateral trade rule book, it runs the risk of becoming an obstacle in the negotiations as big powers are increasingly turning protectionist. India’s approach should be guided by pragmatism, one that is able to subsume its national position in the common positions of developing countries and sensitise the developed world on the urgency of reviving WTO for the benefit of all."

**-Mr. Dammu Ravi**, Former Secretary (ER), Ministry of External Affairs



"Plurilaterals can be an option to push rule-making in new areas of trade policy, but not at the expense of diluting the fundamental principles of consensus and MFN. India therefore has to take the lead in defining the guardrails that prevent such an outcome."

**-Dr. Pritam Banerjee**, Head, Centre for WTO Studies, IIFT




# RIS

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The word “DAKSHIN” (दक्षिण) is of Sanskrit origin, meaning “South.” The Hon’ble Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi, inaugurated DAKSHIN – Global South Centre of Excellence in November 2023. The initiative was inspired by the deliberations of Global South leaders during the Voice of the Global South Summits. DAKSHIN stands for Development and Knowledge Sharing Initiative. Hosted at the RIS, DAKSHIN has established linkages with leading think tanks and universities across the Global South and is building a dynamic network of scholars working on Global South issues.



AIC at RIS has been working to strengthen India’s strategic partnership with ASEAN in its realisation of the ASEAN Community. AIC at RIS undertakes research, policy advocacy and regular networking activities with relevant organisations and think-tanks in India and ASEAN countries, with the aim of providing policy inputs, up-to-date information, data resources and sustained interaction, for strengthening ASEAN-India partnership.



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BEF aims to serve as a dedicated platform for fostering dialogue on promoting the concept in the Indian Ocean and other regions. The forum focuses on conducting studies on the potential, prospects and challenges of blue economy; providing regular inputs to practitioners in the government and the private sectors; and promoting advocacy for its smooth adoption in national economic policies.



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Knowledge generated endogenously among the Southern partners can help in consolidation of stronger common issues at different global policy fora. The purpose of NeST is to provide a global platform for Southern Think-Tanks for collaboratively generating, systematising, consolidating and sharing knowledge on South South Cooperation approaches for international development.



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