Development Cooperation Review

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Development Cooperation Review (DCR) is an effort towards capturing the myriad development experiences, knowledge sharing and economic cooperation in the globalised world of today. The initiative seeks to document various activities taking place on the development front in developing nations and brings together policymakers, researchers, academicians and development practitioners on a common platform to share their ideas and experiences on development cooperation.

The present issue focuses firstly, on the role South South Cooperation (SSC) and Triangular Cooperation can play in addressing various challenges plaguing the global health sector. Then it talks about how development cooperation taking place between India and Africa has shaped over the years. Additionally, the complementarity between the respective roles of Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has also been looked upon in the current issue.

In the first article, authors Danev Ricardo Pérez Valerino, Armando Rodríguez Batista, Grelia López Álvarez, and Gustavo V. Sierra González focus on how the South-South and Triangular cooperation can contribute towards finding effective and practical solutions for epidemics and epidemiological situations prevalent globally in the XXI century. They suggest that Health Diplomacy can work as a powerful tool to garner greater attention to global health situation through collaboration and substantial development between governments and international organizations. The article talks about how the Oslo Declaration and the 2007 Agenda For Action brought to fore the need for foreign policy to focus on crucial health issues facing the globalised world today and capitalise on the challenges facing the health sector. In addition to this, the authors also discuss various Global Health Initiatives like the GAVI, Global Polio Eradication, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, etc. that have been created to channelise resources towards health models. The example of the educational, scientific and healthcare systems in Cuba, that have strengthened the relations of Cuba with the rest of the world, has been explained in the article.

The next article by Hebatallah Adam, titled “India’s cooperation with Africa: Some Features”, explores the development partnership taking place between India and Africa. India mainly uses the idea
of ‘development compact’ comprising of five modalities for development cooperation, namely, capacity building and training, development finance through lines of credit at concessional rate of interest, grant, trade and technology linked partnership. Today, India is Africa’s fourth largest trading partner. Several initiatives have been taken by the Indian government to promote bilateral trade and investment with the African nations, that include export promotion programme in Africa, India’s duty-free quota-free tariff preference scheme for the least developed countries (LDCs) amongst others. India-Africa Forum Summits have provided essential roadmaps to facilitate the cooperation. The growing bilateral economic and political ties between India and African countries have played major role for the remarkable growth in trade and investment between the two.

The third special article on “BRI and AAGC: Cross-alternative agenda for developing countries”, Ahmad Anwar contradicts with the position of certain scholars who suggest that both BRI and AAGC are competing with each other. Instead, the author underlines how both these initiatives can create opportunities through which the developing countries can gain and also how both of them enhance the bargaining positions for developing countries in the South-South Cooperation.

In the Perspective titled “India-Afghanistan, a tested and proved friendship”, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to India Tahir Qadiry elaborates upon India’s developmental partnership with Afganistan and the benefits accrued to his country out of multiple efforts initiated.

The recently published UNDP-NEPAD report titled “First African South-South Cooperation Report” has been reviewed by Amika Bawa in the Book Review section. The report in review presents a glimpse of the existing institutional mechanisms, the operational modalities and measures towards being undertaken on the African continent to scale up SSC and triangular cooperation. The review notes a need for Southern-led assessment of impact that can allow for the tailoring of future initiatives and bring sustainability in the development cycle.

SSC in Statistics looks at the empirical status of the promise made by the DAC member countries to contribute annually as ODA. Sushil Kumar observes that ODA from all DAC member countries together as a percentage of Gross National Income of the DAC countries never reached the pledged amount in the five decades of development cooperation between 1970 and 2018. The estimated cumulative shortfall amounts to US$ 6.1 trillion. Shortfalls in respect of some select donor countries have also been estimated.

DCR invites policymakers, officials, researchers, academics and development practitioners to contribute to the forthcoming issues to share their ideas, experiences and concerns vis-à-vis development cooperation.
Health Diplomacy as a Mechanism of South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation to Achieve SDGs: The Case of Cuba

Introduction

The process of globalisation, characterised by steady growth, with significant impact on the global population, has been continually modified by technological, political and economic changes. Consequently, the relations established between states have been affected. The settings in the last two decades of a political system that modifies global trade between states and determines other aspects of human development, directly influences the complex relationship between global health and international relations and especially in the field of international cooperation as well as in the scientific development and health public policies (Kickbusch et al. 2007). This scenario has created new global international actors with different roles and responsibilities, as well as new alliances and partnerships that assume a leading role in the human community (Feldbaum and Michaud, 2010).

Generally, the policy in the external field has focused on the protection of national interests, from the point of view...
view of security, economic and territorial development, and ideological interests. This vision has evolved to seek to include, in discussion circles and meetings of high political level, the high degree of importance to human health.¹

In recent years, health policies have had a greater presence and priority on the international agenda.² This situation raises challenges for the countries and international organisations to impose an exponentially greater dialogue between the fields of health and international relations.

Through this paper, we will try to show and characterise briefly an interesting academic tool implemented by governments and other actors of international politics during the last ten years to achieve increasing attention to global health situation from a perspective supported by collaboration, solidarity and comprehensive development between countries and international institutions.

This academic tool, the Health Diplomacy, has become a useful initiative to be used by governments and international organisations in order to advance through South-South collaboration in achieving compliance with the SDGs implemented by the United Nations. In order to demonstrate this statement, we will use as a case study actions and procedures in Health Diplomacy of Cuba focusing on examples that occurred during the present century.

Science and Health on International Relations

Historically the fields of Science, Health and International Relations, although are not complete strangers, the relationship between them has not been considered as a prominent topic by foreign ministries, considering this matter to be of low priority. In this sense, the trend generally, has always been to appreciate as “high politics” all matters related with war and peace, economics and trade. However, it should be noted that since ancient times health and diseases (as a result and as a weapon) were a matter of high importance in the wars, particularly during the great wars of the nineteenth and twentieth century.³

It is a proven fact, and studied by specialists in health policies, that the international trade and finance, population mobility, environmental change, international conflicts and disasters, as well as issues of international security, among others factors, showed an impact on health. There are stronger links between health and foreign policy related with fields as transportation, commerce, tourism and emigration.⁴

For example, due to spread of infectious diseases that impacted negatively on trade between countries the nineteenth century saw various forms of international cooperation in the health sector, resulting in countries laying great importance on the health related infrastructure of the ports. From there on it became necessary to regulate this situation and in 1832 the International Health Regulations were created.

Since 1945, after the establishment of the United Nations, the reconstruction of post-war economies and the increasing liberalisation of trade have led to the creation of numerous international agreements and institutional arrangements related to health.⁵ Some examples are: the Alma Ata’s Declaration on Primary Health Care (1978) by World Health
Organization (WHO); and the significant attention given to the issue of HIV / AIDS by global or regional Heads of States in the Declaration of Nassau where Caribbean Community (CARICOM)’s Heads of State recognised the health of populations as part of the wealth of this geographic region (2001). There is also an example of the convergence of trade and health interests in 2002 and 2003 with the outbreak of Severe Respiratory Distress Syndrome (SARS) that affected the Asian region. In addition, during Trinidad and Tobago’s Summit of CARICOM heads of state (2007) widely discussed the situation of chronic non-communicable diseases.6

However, it should be noted that after the aforementioned Declaration of Alma Ata (WHO, 1978), global health agenda has been driven mainly by the appearance of diseases by health promotion, with the emergence of the term of health security. Even though the nations present agreed to the provision of basic health needs with a model called “Primary Health Care”, the language used in the Declaration consisted of an ambiguous interpretation, indicating that many governments did not show their real commitments (Aguilar Morales JE, 2006).

Global Health Diplomacy: A Branch of Science Diplomacy
Since 2005, the WHO has been at the center of the new relationship between health and foreign policy. This has been possible because of the negotiations for the formulation and enactment of the Framework Convention for the Control of Snuff, the new International Health Regulations and the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property.7

Another point to note in this transformation was the launch of the Initiative on Global Health and Foreign Policy (GHFP) signed in March 2007 at Oslo Declaration in the Norway’s capital, by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand. This initiative was signed in order to move towards a foreign policy that could take into account the considerations beyond the global crises and health emergencies. This initiative seeks to promote the use of health lens in the formulation of foreign policy to work together towards common goals. The Oslo Declaration and 2007 Agenda for Action noted the urgency of extending the field of foreign policy to encompass priority health issues in the age of globalisation and interdependence, becoming a reference document that allows for advancement in the protection of the inhabitants of the planet.

This positive change in the nature and perspective of the relationship between health policy and foreign policy is both a challenge and an opportunity for countries and organisations in terms of international cooperation. In this globalised world, every country and sub-region has a significant number of problems, challenges, opportunities and commitments that match the condition of interdependence between science development, health issues and foreign affairs policies. This scenario displays clearly the need to capitalise on global health opportunities for the benefit of the people, for realising their rights and aspirations and meeting commitments around the world. That is why it is essential to attract national and institutional capacities to ensure effective management of these opportunities and
to address the associated risks and threats to health.

Following these premises a technical and academic programme known by some specialists as Global Health Diplomacy or GHD (Kickbusch et al. 2007) was configured. In that way, several academic institutions and Think Tanks have begun, as envisaged in the Oslo Declaration, to play a critical role with the aim of raising the profile of science and health as a topic of concern for foreign policy. Starting from scientific research programmes, these institutions have generated an academic movement while working towards improving the training opportunities for both diplomats and specialists in public health, at the interface that connects health and foreign policy.

Following this, academic programmes focusing on health issues have been implemented primarily, e.g. at the Center for Strategic and International Studies based in Washington through the Global Health Policy Center and in addition, at the Institute for Global Health of Beijing, Center for Global Health Security Chatham House in London, Fiocruz Institute of Brazil through the Institute for Global Health, and Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland (Kickbusch, 2009).

Most of these institutions have published studies related to the relationship between Health’s Governance and Health System’s Development Process in the nations that are required to analyse the changes that have occurred in the architecture of international health cooperation in recent years. Undoubtedly, this fact represents a different and innovative behaviour as compared to what happened in the field of international health after World War II. Some of the notable changes include:

- proliferation of new transnational actors and private actors in the corporate business sector, including for-profit companies, philanthropic sector and business associations, and non-governmental development organizations in developed countries;
- growing role of international financial institutions in the financing and governance of the health sector in countries of low and middle income; and
- progressive role of private sector in the development of public policies, particularly developed countries private agents influencing public policy in developing countries.

Dr. Ilona Kirksbush, General Director of the GHD Programme at the Institute of Graduate International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, has stated that GHD tries to relate with the negotiation process in which multiple actors are involved in varying degrees of political and economic relevance, in shaping and coordinating global policy environment for health (Kickbusch et al. 2010). Ideally, the results of global health diplomacy show in three main effects:

- to ensure better health security and health outcomes of the population for each of the countries involved (serving national and global interests);
- to improve relations between States and strengthen the commitment of a wide range of actors working to improve health; and
- to provide an understanding of health as a common effort for security as a human right and a global public good, with the objectives of achieving results
that are considered fair for a majority of the population (e.g., reducing poverty, increasing, equity, etc.)

From the academic point of view, we can see that these GHD programmes encompass public health disciplines, international relations, management, law and economics disciplines and focus on the negotiations leading global policy environment for health. The main content of these disciplines are aimed at preparing specialists in negotiations of agreements related to public health across national borders and in other forums, global health governance, foreign policy and health and development of national strategies for global health.

**Global Health Initiatives**

During the last decade, this academic movement has served, according to its promoters, for supporting the rise of a wide variety of coalitions, networks and alliances, and specialists appointed by the Global Health Initiatives (GHI), which have proliferated in the field of international cooperation for development, especially on new health policies. Those GHIs have been created as a necessary step to address the complex challenges of the global health agenda and channel additional resources for health organizational model. Some of the most known are the Global Polio Eradication, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), Alliances Stop TB, Roll Back Malaria, Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), Multi-Country HIV / AIDS Programme (MAP) of the World Bank, among others.

Regardless of these, the reality is that there are a few GHI which are financially and politically important and are playing a key role in global health governance. One of the most powerful and known of them is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, a philanthropic institution, that has been recognised as an important source of funding and influence in global health activities.

However, the growing importance of these GHI raises deep challenges that compromise the sovereignty of states and their links with international cooperation considering the financial resources invested to promote decisions in their favor at high political and legal levels.

It is important to note that, despite the increased financial resources from the private sector, the public sector continues to provide most of the funds. Private contributions to global health funding are a minor fraction of the total assistance. However, private actors have increased disproportionately in comparison with the amount of funds. This fact have generated greater visibility regarding how important must be the control of political power in the framework of global governance linked to the cooperation on health issues.

This is one of the reasons that compel us to consider that the results obtained so far are not entirely positive. Most of the funding from the GHI and programmes promoted by the GHD are oriented towards disease vertical control programmes, with very little support to strengthen basic health infrastructure and health systems.

In this sense, many of these interventions have caused an increase in the control that national health authorities must exercise in order to manage resources, undermining national health
development. Therefore, if in the past the main issue was the lack of resources, at present the problem is how to manage and control this complex network of stakeholders without falling into political and economic interference.

Cuba and the Application of Health Diplomacy linked with Science Diplomacy

An example of real implementation of diplomacy based on international collaboration in health has been developed by Cuba during the last 55 years. The Caribbean island, which in 1960 had only 3000 doctors and an incipient scientific and technological development to serve about six million inhabitants, has managed to become a model of hope for international cooperation by attaching top priority to health and better living conditions for its population.

The Educational, Scientific and Healthcare Systems in Cuba

Educational System

Education has always been a major priority for Cuba. The Cuban Revolution gave health a key priority with significant momentum from which the National Literacy Campaign also gained.

Since then, the National Education System of the Republic of Cuba, conceived as a set of subsystems, organically is articulated at all levels. This system began to develop during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s of last century when they were implementing challenging programmes of training of human resources and that allowed thousands of young people to participate in different fields of health and science, both in Cuba and in different countries of the world. At the same time, the government invested millions of dollars in the creation of universities across the country creating a network of broad participation and desire to study among youth.

Moreover, in Cuba there are 50 university-level establishments, of which 22 belong to the Ministry of Higher Education. Those institutions of higher education include more than 16000 full-time professors and more than 2000 associate professors part time. It should be noted that since 1959 to date more than one million students have graduated in different university courses and about 40 per cent of university graduates are engaged in postgraduate courses annually. Therefore, we are talking about an established educational system that continuously carried out changes in the direction of improving the cognitive abilities of the population.

Scientific Development System

According to official statistics, at the end of 2018 Cuba had 86426 people dedicated to Science Technology and Innovation (STI) activities, of which 53 per cent were women. Of them, 77 per cent have higher or technical degrees and more than 6800 have a scientific status as researchers. This scientific force works in 135 specialised research centers, 63 development and research units as well as 22 centers of scientific-technological services. There are 33 national science programmes directly linked to strategic axes and sectors that contribute to the economic and social development Plan proposed by the Government for 2030. There is a solid relationship between scientific institutions, universities and the biopharmaceutical
industry where public policies are implemented to continue developing the scientific sector.

**Health Care System**

Meanwhile, over the last 60 years Cuban government has been operating a national health system and assumes fiscal and administrative responsibility for the health care of all its citizens. There are no private hospitals or clinics as all health services are government-run. Based on the educational system described above and the large investments made by the government, Cuba has been able to create a health system that provides inclusive healthcare for its people.

The maternal and childcare programme has made, among other goals, the reduction of infant and maternal mortality, leading the concept of preventive immunisation of all children who are vaccinated against 13 diseases. Cuba was the first Latin American country to meet the goals of primary health care as the international strategy of Alma Ata, adopted in 1978.

Despite the ongoing United States embargo against Cuba during the 1990s, which caused problems due to restrictions on the exportation of medicines from the US to Cuba, the investment in human resources and facilities has enabled it with a strength that certainly explains the current results of health services in Cuba.

Given the country’s population, and the existence of multiple economic difficulties, we can say that there has been a significant achievement as well as success due to the decision made to invest in improving life conditions through scientific and technical development in health.

**Impact of Education and Health Services of Cuba in Global Health Diplomacy**

Five decades ago Cuba had 3000 doctors in 1959, the strength now has increased by more than 70,000 medical specialists, 90,000 nurses, and about 30000 health technicians who provide high quality services to more than 11 million inhabitants. More than 134000 Cuban health workers, trained in the past 40 years, have provided services in more than 108 nations in Latin America, Africa, Asia and even Europe, under different collaborative programmes, coordinated by the Cuban Ministry of Health with support from other governments, non-governmental organizations and the regional health authorities. In addition, the Caribbean island, with its own resources and expertise has promoted the creation of and support to international medical schools in Cuba and several countries. Innovative and proactive Cuban teaching methods have been used through which thousands of young people have completed medical programmes and other health specialties. During the current century, several examples have shown the style implemented by the government of Havana to employ health and outcomes in the education system as an efficient and supportive mechanism to improve relations with different countries and agencies worldwide following Science Diplomacy programmes.

**Cuban Response to the Pakistan Earthquake (2005)**

After the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, Cuba sent over 2,400 physicians and paramedical staff and established 32 field hospitals and two relief camps.
In addition to nurses, paramedics and doctors the government of Cuba sent tons of medical equipment and medicines. Approximately 30 amputee patients were flown to Cuba for treatments. Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf expressed his contentment at the efforts of Fidel Castro and appreciated the services of the Cuban medical teams.

From October 2005 to 24 January 2006, Cuban medical teams performed 601,369 consultations, 5,925 surgeries including 2,819 major surgeries and served at 44 different locations in the quake-affected region.

Cuban Response to the Tsunami Hit in Asian Countries (2006)
Medical teams from Cuba operated clinics in Indonesia and Sri Lanka following the tsunami that rolled across the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2006, taking hundreds of thousands of lives.

Cuban government, as envisaged in an agreement with the Indonesian authorities implemented fast way transfer of a medical brigade to assist the affected population. A team of 25 volunteers went to Aceh, in Indonesia, and treated wounds, infections, respiratory diseases and psychological shock behaviors.

In Sri Lanka, the Cuban volunteer team set up a temporary clinic in Galle, 70 miles from Colombo, undertaking a demanding work in coordination with the health authorities of this country and international organizations.

South-South Collaboration in the Field of Biotech
A partnership between the Institute of Immunobiological Technology (Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz), of Brazil, and the Finlay Institute in Cuba, allowed an effective response to an emergency appeal of the World Health Organization (WHO) for distribution of vaccines for the called Meningitis Belt in Africa. The area, which stretches from Senegal in the west to the east of Ethiopia, between 2006 and 2007 had at least 14 warnings of disease outbreaks.

The Finlay Vaccine Institute, based in Havana City with a long history of meningitis research, managed to control a meningitis outbreak in Cuba in the mid-1980s, developing a purified meningococcal vaccine that was the first of its kind worldwide. Bio-Manguinhos Institute, based in Rio de Janeiro, also has extensive experience in vaccine research and manufacturing, and has developed an efficient scale-up process using lyophilization. By collaborating and relying on their respective strengths, these two organizations were able to supply, in a timely fashion, meningitis A vaccine capable of combating the African meningitis outbreak.

For other side, WHO also facilitated the collaboration by making it possible for ANVISA, the regulatory agency in Brazil, to collaborate with the Cuban regulatory agency CECMED. The agencies were able to exchange information about their respective regulatory systems, which made it possible for them to align the collaborative process. Neither Bio-Manguinhos nor the Finlay Institute alone would have been able to respond so quickly and efficiently to this request. This example, therefore, demonstrates how South-South collaboration could be harnessed to address a health threat when spurred by demand and funding from an international organization. It also shows how South-South collaboration...
can contribute toward improving global health.

Since the start of production of vaccines for the region, the joint initiative has already provided more than 20 million doses by various international organizations, such as WHO, Médecins Sans Frontières, the United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF) and the International Committee Red Cross.

Earthquake in Haiti and the Response of the Cuban Health System
Cuba was the first country to arrive in Haiti with emergency medical help after the earthquake of 12 January 2010. Cuban medical teams played a key role in assisting earthquake victims. Public health experts say the Cubans were the first to enable medical facilities among the ruins and strengthen hospitals immediately after the earthquake.18

Haiti and Cuba signed a medical cooperation agreement in 1998. Before the earthquake struck, 344 Cuban health professionals were already present in Haiti, providing primary care and obstetrical services as well as restoring the sight of Haitians blinded by eye diseases. Medical staff flew shortly after the earthquake as part of the rapid response.

In almost 15 years of presence of the Cuban medical brigade in Haiti, especially after the earthquake, 20946528 patients have been treated, 6792394 were seen in their own homes. There have been 373513 surgeries, 140191 of them were the major ones and have been assisted 150336 births, 16481 by caesarean. In addition, through Operation Miracle programme, 60281 Haitians returned or improved their vision, while 322753 have been treated in rehabilitation, 55707 fully rehabilitated.19

Health Policies + International Relations = GHD
Another approach has been the internationalisation of agile, safe and free method of health care as Miracle Operation (Operacion Milagro in Spanish), which has restored or improved vision for millions of Latin American, African and other regions of the world through intergovernmental cooperation programmes that allow free access of patients to public attention system.

This programme is a health plan that was initially implemented jointly by the governments of Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 and was included as part of the programme group of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) to improve the health levels of several developing countries. According to statistical data consulted in the Ministry of Public Health of Cuba, at the end of 2017 more than four million people without resources from 34 countries had been operated of vision thanks to this programme free of cost supported by funds from ALBA and other institutions.20

Cuba and Venezuela with the approval of the local health authorities have generated a network of 49 ophthalmological centers with 82 surgical positions in 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Guatemala, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guyana, Paraguay, Granada, Nicaragua and Uruguay.21

As if this was not enough, Cuba has managed to deploy and maintain an extraordinary scientific and technological system whose highest point is a biopharmaceutical industry. Through a closed cycle that allow to
develop quickly and efficiently, registration and commercialisation of vaccines and biopharmaceutical products characterised by their novelty, quality and especially the philosophical view they are affordable for countries and companies with fewer resources. In this line, there is pharmaceutical market for more than 50 products with high impact and benefit in more than 60 countries on all continents.

Those results have been supported by diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have collaborated with these programmes implemented at national level followed by its application in dozens of countries. These examples highlight the interaction between the Ministries of Health, Science and Technology and Foreign Affairs which work together in these developing collaborative projects. With this strength of human resource and principles, based on the collaboration and solidarity, Cuba, has become one of the largest and best examples of the practice of GHD.

Thus, using techniques, resources and plans based on GHD, Cuba has significantly enhanced its relations with a large number of countries, the scientific and technical development and the development of human knowledge, in this case in the field of health.

**Conclusion**

The world of the XXI century is a complex world, in which the development that humankind has achieved in science and technology can’t yet deliver real benefits to the entire population of our planet. In our humble opinion, the contrasts and differences between developed and developing countries are increasing every day. In this sense, human health is essential that must be of the utmost concern for all nations. There is a need to map the high level of agreements that are needed for ensuring to include all those countries which have fewer resources, weak health systems and poor technical scientific development.

In this sense GHD is an academic tool which, theoretically, is trying to achieve an agreement between the richest countries to raise awareness about the real situation and health policies that are required to achieve better results in those countries with fewer incomes. That is why, the role of governments, NGOs, the biopharmaceutical industry, regulatory agencies and the sound educational system is essential. The way all these actors could be sensitised and act together or not, will depend on the success of this program, and this can be a first conclusion in this paper.

Cuba’s example has showed how far a country with limited economic resources can carry out actions of solidarity, cooperation and scientific exchange to increase its international relations with countries of the world while helping health thereof. Obviously, there are difficulties, and it is impossible to say that these programmes are perfect, but our intention in this paper is to show a different model that gradually tries to share with friendly countries what you have. Thus, even though it is not a perfect model, the practice has achieved incredible success by improving the lives of many people on this planet through the practice of GHD as a real branch of Science Diplomacy.
Endnotes

1 For more information review the Oslo Declaration signed in 2007 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand.

2 In addition to the aforementioned Oslo Declaration other resolutions approved by International Organizations such as WHO, PAHO could be consulted, such as CD55/11, 2016 (PAHO), CD56/INF/19, 2019 (PAHO), UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/33.

3 The American writer William McNeill in his book “Plagues and Peoples”, published by the Spanish editorial “Siglo XXI” in 1984 relates several examples that allow to support this. Subsequently, other authors such as Laura Nervi, Laurie Garret and Ilona Kirkbusch have extended the analysis of this issue in articles and studies for international organizations such as WHO.


5 In January 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 63/33, which was a boost for the actions that were previously executed in several scenarios.

6 Group of chronic, non-communicable diseases, which traditionally predominate in nations of high level of development due to the high cost of their therapeutic treatments to extend the life of patients. Cancer, diabetes and cardiovascular diseases are the best known in this regard.

7 Also see the article published by Dr. Kickbush and Dr. Berger “Global Health Diplomacy” at R. Elect.de Com. Inf. Innov. Saúde. R. de Janeiro, v.4, No.1, p 18-22, Mar, 2010.

8 Also see available articles published by Dr Ilona Kirkbusch, M. Thieren and others.

9 Statistical data updated from the website of the Cuban Ministry of Higher Education retrieved from https://www.mes.gob.cu/es/clausto-universitario


11 Statistical data presented in the 2018 Summary of the scientific development in Cuba by the Minister of Science Dr. Elba Rosa Perez (See more information Retrieved from http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2018/12/28/la-ciencia-en-cuba-una-mirada-a-sus-retos-y-proyecciones/#.XaCl139rG1s)

12 Idem


14 Statistical data updated from the website of the Cuban Ministry of Health. 2018

15 Idem


20 Statistical data updated from the website of the Cuban Ministry of Health. 2018

21 Idem
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Special Article

India’s Cooperation with Africa: Some Features

Hebatallah Adam*

“In the past few decades, while North-South cooperation is the main channel for development cooperation, South-South cooperation has turned into a prominent tool to faster development efforts in the South countries.”

Introduction

Cooperation for sustainable development in Global South has seen the light through a variety of approaches and practices that involve multiple stakeholders (including governments, private sector, civil society and regional and international organizations). The South-South Cooperation (SSC) covers both financial and non-financial tools of development cooperation. For the financial tools, they include direct grants and lines of credit. The non-financial tools are more diverse, which include capacity-building, technology and knowledge development and transfer, joint action for policy change and partnerships. The non-financial tools play a significant role in SSC and they are considered as the core actions in the Global South initiatives.

In the past few decades, while North-South cooperation has been the main channel for development cooperation, SSC has turned into a prominent tool to faster development efforts in the South countries. It has accelerated regional, sub-regional and interregional integration, and has provided innovative approaches for collective actions. South-South and Triangular Cooperation empowers developing countries in their mission to achieve the 2030 Global Agenda for Sustainable Development through a joint collaboration in order to create a fair and equitable new international economic order (UN, 2019).

India and Africa share political, social and economic relations dating back to many centuries. The ongoing India-Africa engagements within the framework of SSC include socio-political and

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commercial issues, capacity building, development cooperation, and economic and technological initiatives. This paper undertakes an analysis of the India-Africa development cooperation partnership. It is divided into three main parts. At first part, we start with the literature review of the concepts of South-South and Triangular Cooperation. In second part, we give an insight about India’s role in South-South and Triangular Cooperation as a global donor. The last part emphasise India’s South-South and Triangular Cooperation partnership with the African countries.

Literature Review of South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation

SSC isn’t a new concept, it has been part of the international development dialogues for decades as an expression of collaboration and solidarity between the Southern countries. Developing nations tend to share joint visions on national development strategies and main concerns as they are mostly facing similar development challenges. Accordingly, dealing with same type of challenges and sharing same experiences has emphasised the vital development role that can be fulfilled by an international initiative as part of SSC.

The High-level Committee on SSC 17th session (May, 2012) defines the SSC as the “process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organisations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. SSC is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South Cooperation”. The definition, however, is not uncontested.

The SSC is a technique of development cooperation tools. It helps developing countries to achieve their sustainable development goals through a wide-ranging framework of collaboration among the Global South community. It covers in-kind or financial assistance, technical and capacity building solutions at all levels of cooperation such as political, social, economic and environmental. The SSC can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub-regional or intra-regional basis.

What makes SSC different from the traditional North-South Cooperation is that it is basically built on the principles of (1) non-conditionality, (2) mutual benefit, (3) respect of national sovereignty, ownership and priorities, and (4) multi-stakeholder approach including non-governmental organisations, the private sector, and civil society.

The SSC is reflected in greater South-South trade volumes, foreign grants, Lines of Credit, Foreign Direct Investment between developing countries. It covers also knowledge sharing, training, technical assistance, and technology transfer to enhance sustainable development in the Southern sphere of the world. By SSC, developing countries are becoming themselves initiators of cooperation in several different areas, such as capacity building, institutional strengthening, health, gender equality, climate change, food safety, scientific and technological innovation and regional integration (UN, 2019).
SSC is argued to be strengthened by Triangular Cooperation which has been introduced as an innovative tool of collaboration among three main partners: traditional donors, emerging markets and developing countries. The High-level Committee on SSC 17th session (May, 2012) defines Triangular Cooperation as “Southern-driven partnerships between two or more developing countries, supported by a developed country(ies) or multilateral organization(s), to implement development cooperation programmes and projects”. There are debates around this definition, though.

Triangular Cooperation has been presented as a new creative modality that works on building bridges and generating synergies between the two basic development cooperation approaches: North- South and SSC. Triangular Cooperation involves at the same time three types of partners that play three major roles based on their respective comparative advantages (AFRODAD, 2012):

- **The Facilitator**: It provides financial / technical support to the collaboration. It can be a developed country (ies) or an international organization.
- **The Pivotal Partner**: An emergent developing country (ies) that is having the experience and can share its knowledge and expertise through Triangular Cooperation.
- **The Beneficiary**: The targeted developing country (ies) for development cooperation results.

All major international development cooperation platforms - such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UN-DCF) and the OECD/DAC – endorse and support the role of Triangular Cooperation in South development. Triangular Cooperation

**Figure 1: Foreign Aid Received by India (2007-2017) in Rs Crore**

Cooperation has become also an effective tool to implement the 2030 Global Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). To illustrate, the 17th goal of the SDGs stresses the distinctive role of Triangular Cooperation in promoting the sharing of knowledge, technology transfer and capacity building (UN, 2015).

India’s Role in South-South and Triangular Cooperation

From being one of the world’s largest recipient of foreign aid in the mid-1980s, India has evolved as a significant contributor to global development process. Since the end of 2002, India, a traditional borrower from IMF, has become a lender to the multilateral institutions. According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI, 2005), India was nominated by the IMF to become a member of its Financial Transaction Plan (FTP) from the quarter September-November 2002. Countries with solid balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves position have been selected to contribute to the FTP, to help IMF finance the Balance of Payments needs of other countries. According to statistics published by the Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, the foreign aid received by India has significantly decreased from Rs. 2622.3 crore in 2007 to Rs. 950.82 crore in 2017, which indicates that it has decreased by more than half (-64 per cent) of its value in 10 years.

SSC has traditionally been an important pillar of India’s foreign policy and diplomacy (OECD. 2012). Since its independence from Britain in 1947, India has been sharing its development experience with the South countries in the bilateral, regional or multilateral framework. As it is shown in Table 1, India’s SSC history goes back to the beginnings of the 1950s by being a founding member of the Colombo Plan (1950) that aims to strengthen economic and social development of member countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The primary focus of Colombo Plan activities is on the development of human resources in the region.

The end of the Cold War, India’s post-1991 economic growth and its nuclear tests in 1998 have made India to become a key member of G-77, Commonwealth, G-20, NAM, and numerous other developing country blocs (such as: ASEAN, APEC, Shanghai Cooperation Council, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC), SAARC Development Fund and IBSA) and development associations. India also participates actively in many institutions of global governance such as the United Nations (UN), especially in its Security Council, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, India has assisted seven Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) - Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Guyana and Nicaragua - by cancelling US$24 million worth of their debt (Reality of Aid Management Committee. 2010).

By the beginning of 2000s, India’s development cooperation projects have started to increase substantially. In January 2012, the Ministry of External Affairs has created the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) to oversee all aspects of the handling of India’s assistance projects. It has three divisions headed by Joint Secretary level officers (Ministry of External Affairs. 2019, July 4).
The Development Partnership Administration (DPA) within the Ministry of External Affairs co-ordinates India’s bilateral development cooperation. It manages grants and the Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation Programme. The Ministry of Finance manages multilateral assistance and exercises administrative oversight over the concessional loans and lines of credit provided by the Export Import Bank (EXIM Bank).

India is providing basically development cooperation assistance to developing countries through three different tools:

- **Grants:** Grants are provided to recipient nations in various sectors including education, healthcare, housing, infrastructure, etc. India’s grants outflows are managed by Development Partnership Administration (DPA) I, II and III.

- **Lines of Credit (LoCs):** Facilitated by the EXIM Bank, LoCs are extended to partnering countries, financial institutions, regional development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>India gains independence, begins development assistance activities almost immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>India provides programme-based development cooperation as grants, alongside scholarships and humanitarian assistance to Bhutan, Nepal and a few sub-Saharan nations, focus on Afro-Asian solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>The Bandung conference held in April, first large-scale Afro-Asian Conference. It Aims to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neo-colonialism by any nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement comes into being led by India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Indonesia and Ghana. The NAM aims to ensure &quot;the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries&quot;. Since the end of Cold War, NAM is focusing on developing multilateral ties and connections among the Global South nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>India Development Initiative (IDI), located within the Ministry of Finance, is established to evolve development assistance framework. Under IDI, India was to borrow in the international capital markets and then on-lend on concessional terms to less credit-worthy countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. At least 85 per cent of the value of such loans was to be tied to Indian procurement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) established to facilitate Lines of Credit (LoC) through EXIM Bank. It works with the objective of sharing India’s development experience through: (1). capacity building and skills transfer, (2) trade, and (3). infrastructure development,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>India co-founded the Global Network of Exim Banks and Development Finance Institutions (G-NEXID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Development Partnership Administration (DPA) created as a separate agency within the Ministry of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Collected by the Author from a variety of sources.*
banks, etc. LoCs allow partners to buy goods and services from India on deferred credit terms. India’s LoCs are administered and coordinated by DPA-I and EXIM Bank.

- **Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation programme (ITEC):** Established in 1964, it is an initiative centred on skills training. It aims to further technical cooperation and capacity building with other developing nations across the globe but largely focused in the Asian and the African regions. The ITEC programme is coordinated by DPA-II.

India comes after China as world emerging providers of development finance that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In 2015, OECD estimated the development-oriented contributions of India to and through multilateral organisations counted to an overall amount of US$188.3 million (Annexe 1). The amount of total assistance provided by India to foreign countries annually in the time period from 2006-07 to 2015-16 has increased by 5.83 times, from a total value of Rs. 1323.68 crore in 2006-07 to Rs. 7719.65 crore in 2015-16 (Ministry of External Affairs. 2017).

According to the OECD (2019, July 5), the main sectors covered by the India’s development cooperation are health, education, energy (hydropower) and information technology. In 2015, India’s multilateral flows were primarily channelled through the International Development Association (35 per cent), as well as through the United Nations (31 per cent). (OECD. 2017)

India’s SSC outflow has considerably increased from 2008 to 2016, it has nearly doubled from US$0.82 billion in 2008 to US$1.78 billion in 2016 (Development Initiatives Poverty Research, 2019, July 5). India’s priority partner countries are basically its neighbours in South Asia. Between 2011 and 2016, Bhutan received 65.26 per cent of India’s bilateral development cooperation, followed by Afghanistan (10.24 per cent), Sri Lanka (5.96 per cent), Nepal (5.22 per cent), Bangladesh (4.04 per cent), Maldives (2.08 per cent), and Myanmar (2.02 per cent). During same time period, India’s development cooperation with Africa has increased 2.48 times from Rs. 114.26 crore in 2011 to Rs. 283.83 crore in 2016, which makes Africa come at the fifth rank in development receivers from India after Bhutan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and

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**Table 2: Development Partnership Administration (DPA) divisions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DPA-I</th>
<th>It deals with project appraisal and lines of credit; assesses grant projects in East, South and West African regions, Bangladesh, and the Sri Lankan Housing project.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPA-II</td>
<td>It focuses on capacity building schemes, disaster relief, ITEC programme, Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa programme (SCAAP), implementation of Colombo Plan; and also assesses grant projects in southeast Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, and Latin America. Humanitarian and disaster relief is also handled by this division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA-III</td>
<td>It deals with the implementation of grant assistance projects in Afghanistan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of External Affairs (2019, July 4).*
Figure 2: Total Assistance Provided by India to Foreign Countries (2006-2016) (in Rs. crore)


Figure 3: Assistance Provided by India to Africa (2011-2016) (Rs. in crore)

India’s South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation in Africa

As can be seen, India has developed since independence a solid development cooperation strategy that is mainly based on the idea of Development Compact. India is utilising the five modalities of development cooperation in its long-standing partnership with the African countries.

A large share of India’s development actions in Africa is bilateral. Besides that, India has also Triangular Cooperation projects in the African continent that have been undertaken through India’s partnership with multilateral mechanisms such as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum; or the trilateral cooperation mechanisms between India, African countries and an international organization like the USAID (i.e. for building food security in Malawi), the UNDP (i.e. for the IBSA Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation) and the DFID (i.e. for Supporting Indian Trade and Investments for Africa - SITA).

India-Africa Trade and Investment

Over the last decade, India has emerged as Africa’s fourth-largest trading partner. The bilateral trade between India and Africa has registered a remarkable growth. A joint report – prepared by the African Export-Import Bank, Afreximbank and the EXIM Bank of India (2018), and Malancha Chakrabarty (2018) - has underlined that several initiatives have been undertaken by the government of India to promote the bilateral trade and investment flows with African countries, including:

Focus export promotion programme in Africa: Launched in March 2002 with seven African countries but later extended

Table 3: Assistance Provided by India to Foreign Countries from 2011 to 2016 (Rs. in crore)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>281.2</td>
<td>604.66</td>
<td>197.84</td>
<td>155.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>2021.37</td>
<td>3410.98</td>
<td>3926.78</td>
<td>4395.17</td>
<td>5368.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>191.15</td>
<td>292.55</td>
<td>381.37</td>
<td>303.26</td>
<td>309.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>181.94</td>
<td>248.2</td>
<td>420.8</td>
<td>499.7</td>
<td>403.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>285.7</td>
<td>16.43</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>55.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>121.88</td>
<td>164.86</td>
<td>104.34</td>
<td>117.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Developing Countries</td>
<td>25.47</td>
<td>30.95</td>
<td>61.28</td>
<td>54.13</td>
<td>103.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>114.26</td>
<td>239.64</td>
<td>251.92</td>
<td>142.86</td>
<td>283.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>29.47</td>
<td>32.66</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>19.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>7.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>27.61</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>12.17</td>
<td>15.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>326.61</td>
<td>490.96</td>
<td>585.31</td>
<td>723.52</td>
<td>880.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3254.22</td>
<td>5193.81</td>
<td>6427.44</td>
<td>6473.29</td>
<td>7719.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to twenty-four. The main objective of the initiative was to deepen India’s trade relations with Africa. Under this programme, India extends assistance to exporters and Export Promotion Councils to undertake visits to African countries to organize trade fairs, exhibitions, hold B-2-B meetings and facilitate visits of African trade delegations in India.

**India’s Duty-Free Tariff Preference scheme for the Least Developed Countries:** Announced in 2008 to give support to the LDCs in their trade initiatives, under this scheme, India is providing duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis, for all products originating from all LDCs (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2017).

**IAFS (India-Africa Forum Summits):** First held in 2008 in New Delhi, IAFS is the official platform for the African-Indian relations. The third India-Africa Forum Summit was held in New Delhi in October 2015, it has underlined the focus of India on strengthening and enhancing its partnership with countries in the African continent. (IDSA. 2019 July 5)

**India’s EXIM Bank:** Plays an important role in promoting India’s investments in Africa. In addition to operating concessional lines of credits, the EXIM Bank supports Indian companies by extending loans and guarantees, and equity participation. EXIM Bank has also launched the SITA (Supporting India’s Trade Preferences for Africa) initiative which is a partnership with the International Trade Centre to promote trade and investment between India and five East African countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) by supporting SMEs in their access to finance, technology and skills.

India-Africa’s bilateral trade volumes statistics are showing that it has increased from only US$7.2 billion in 2001 to US$59.9 billion in 2017. India’s exports to Africa count for 8 per cent of India’s total exports, and 4.6 per cent of Africa’s total imports. In fact, India-Africa trade pattern has changed significantly during the last two decades. In 2017, India’s export to Africa was dominated by petroleum products, medicine and pharmaceutical products, and road vehicles which together accounted for 38.8 per cent of India’s total exports to Africa (Table 4). South Africa, Mozambique, Mauritius, Kenya, and Tanzania have received over 82 per cent of India’s exports of petroleum refined products to the African continent in 2017.

India’s import from Africa consists mainly of natural resources. An analysis of the import component of India from the African region shows (Table 5):

- The share of petroleum (mostly crude) in India’s imports from Africa increased from 34.3 per cent in 2001 to 41.7 per cent in 2017. Nigeria and Angola are the major exporter of petroleum with 61.6 per cent and 20.3 per cent, respectively, of India’s total imports of petroleum products from Africa in 2017.
- The share of gold, which is the second-largest India’s import from Africa (14.9 per cent in 2017), remains high. Ghana (48.4 per cent), South Africa (22.8 per cent) and Tanzania (12.3 per cent) are the major exporters of gold to India from Africa.
- The shares of inorganic chemicals and of metalliferous ores and metal scrap, which together accounted for around 7.1 per cent of India’s imports from Africa in 2017.
The shares of commodities - such as coal, coke and briquettes; non-metallic manufactures; and natural and manufactured gas - exported to India from Africa has increased significantly in same time period. South Africa and Mozambique supplied over 98 per cent of India’s imports of coal, coke and briquettes from Africa in 2017, while Botswana, Angola and South Africa together supplied over 84 per cent of India’s imports of non-metallic mineral manufactures from Africa in 2017. Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial together accounted around 90 per cent of total Africa’s export to India of natural and manufactured gas.

Indian investments in Africa, from both public and private sector entities, have increased considerably in the last two decades. According to the World Investment Report 2017, India was the seventh largest investor in Africa in 2015 (UN. 2017). Between 2010 and 2014, the flows of Indian FDI to the African countries have increased from US$11.9 billion to US$15.2 billion (Afreximbank and Exim India. 2018). India’s African investments

### Table 4: India’s Major Exports to Africa by Sector (per cent share in India’s total exports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India’s Total Exports to Africa</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicinal and pharmaceutical products</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road vehicles</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals and cereal preparations</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile yarn and related products</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized machinery</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures of metal, n.e.s.*</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic chemicals</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other industrial machinery and parts</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel &amp; clothing accessories</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, sugar preparations and honey</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat and meat preparations</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics in primary forms</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and paper manufactures</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Transport Equipment</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*n.e.s - not elsewhere specified*
Table 5: India’s Major Imports from Africa by Sector (per cent share in India’s total imports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India’s Total Imports from Africa</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores &amp; concentrates)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal, coke and briquettes</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas, natural and manufactured</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruits</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metalliferous ores and metal scrap</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inorganic chemicals</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude fertilizers other than division 56, and crude minerals</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles fibres and their wastes</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp and waste paper</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cork and wood</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power generating machinery and equipment</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic chemicals</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afreximbank and Exim India (2018).

*n.e.s - not elsewhere specified

are often in natural resource industries, textiles, information and communications technology, banking and automotive industries.

Data collected from the Reserve Bank of India (2016) shows that Africa accounts for 22 per cent of India’s Overseas Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) which is equal to US$5.5 billion in terms of value (Table 6). Mauritius accounts alone for 85.77 per cent of the total investments in Africa for the time period 2012-2016. Cumulative FDI outflows from India to Mauritius have reached US$23 billion for the time period 2012-2016. Apart from Mauritius, the top five African countries that have received the maximum OFDI from India over the same time period are: Mozambique, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia and Egypt (OXFAM. 2018).

Indian Lines of Credit to Africa

The Indian Lines of Credit are like a ‘soft loan’ provided on concessional interest rates to developing countries. They essentially promote India’s exports of goods and services, as 75 per cent of the value of the contract must be sourced from India. The Indian LoCs are demand driven and aligned to the national development priorities of the recipient countries. The projects under LoCs are spread over different sectors including for instance: agriculture, infrastructure, telecom, railway, transmission/power, renewable energy among others.
Table 6: Major African destinations for Indian Overseas Foreign Direct Investment in USD million, 2012-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2012-16</th>
<th>Cumulative share for the time period 2012-16 (%)</th>
<th>Cumulative share (excluding Mauritius) for the time period 2012-16 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>4438.91</td>
<td>4581.95</td>
<td>4580.79</td>
<td>4043.16</td>
<td>5392.72</td>
<td>23037.53</td>
<td>85.77</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>2643.06</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>2661.05</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>69.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>137.97</td>
<td>19.15</td>
<td>29.50</td>
<td>65.57</td>
<td>32.55</td>
<td>284.74</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>103.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>82.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>190.42</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>79.76</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>148.71</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>76.60</td>
<td>29.18</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>132.65</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>42.19</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>20.91</td>
<td>90.02</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>14.87</td>
<td>21.65</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>58.69</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>24.45</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>39.66</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>27.22</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>35.65</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>18.65</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>33.45</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>12.68</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>30.49</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>28.32</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>11.41</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>24.49</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>9.98</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Republic</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub total</td>
<td>4711.45</td>
<td>7491.25</td>
<td>4789.16</td>
<td>4346.93</td>
<td>5505.11</td>
<td>26843.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All African countries</td>
<td>4717.33</td>
<td>7494.56</td>
<td>4790.18</td>
<td>4349.66</td>
<td>5509.00</td>
<td>26860.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All African countries (excluding Mauritius)</td>
<td><strong>278.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>2912.62</strong></td>
<td><strong>209.39</strong></td>
<td><strong>306.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>116.28</strong></td>
<td><strong>3823.20</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African countries have been always prioritised by the LoCs provided under the Indian development assistance initiatives (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015). Over the time period (2002-2019), there was a remarkable increase in India’s LoCs extended to Africa. Started in 2002 with only a total value of US$10.32 million, it has remarkably increased to reach a total value of US$1384.78 million in 2019. (See Figure 4)

India has extended 186 lines of credit to 42 African countries for a total amount of nearly US$10.493 billion during the time period 2002-2019 (Exim Bank India. 2019 July 5) to finance traditional development projects like: developing infrastructure, irrigation, agriculture and manufacturing development capacity, development of transportation systems, supply of transportation equipment and vehicles, water supply projects, rural electrification project and power projects. India also has traditional areas of cooperation with Africa in IT, science and technology, agriculture, pharmaceuticals. Recently, following the launching of International Solar Alliance (ISA) in March 2018, the nature of Indian LoCs to Africa has taken a new dimension by financing mostly solar energy projects.

During the time period 2002-2019, Senegal, Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, D.R.Congo, and Sudan have received more than half (51.27 per cent) of the total amount of Indian LoCs to Africa with a total value of US$2899.76 million (Figure 5). ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) for West Africa region has also been accredited of one billion USD for the purpose of financing...
exports of various equipment, goods and services, export of goods and services, project exports and development projects.

**India Capacity Building, Training and Grant Assistance to Africa**

India has been providing development assistance to African countries through different development partnership assistance schemes including: grant-in-aid projects, training and capacity building programmes, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance. Starting with the humanitarian assistance, India has helped Ebola affected countries by a contribution of US$10 million for the UN Fund for Ebola and an additional fund of US$2 million for the purchase of protective gear to tackle Ebola for the three Ebola affected countries of West Africa. In addition, India extended a bilateral assistance of US$50,000 to Guinea and Liberia and provided a cash assistance of US$500,000 to WHO. (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2015)

Undoubtedly, India is also committed to establish capacity building of institutions in Africa like: vocational training centres, IT parks, and centres of excellence in various African countries. Indian grant assistance to Africa has been set to fulfil different cooperation development uses like: supplying vehicles, ambulances, agricultural equipment, IT equipment, medical devices, medicines.

Furthermore, India has established scholarships and training for development assistance to promote cultural and educational relations with the African countries. They have been channelled

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**Figure 5: Top Ten African Countries receiving Indian LoCs in USD million (2002-2019)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>LoC (USD million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1285.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1115.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>964.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>772.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>677.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>578.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>547.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>395.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>388.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>312.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s own construction from statistics published by Exim Bank of India (2019 July 5).
by three different modalities: providing training in India, sending teams of Indian experts to African partner countries, and supplying equipment for educational institutions and project sites.

Under the India Africa Forum Summit-I (IAFS-I), India has announced a grant of US$500 million (Rs. 2,700 crore); an additional US$700 million (Rs. 3,300 crore) has also been revealed at IAFS-II. These grants aim to assist capacity building in Africa through: the setting up of specialized institutions, the extension of scholarships and training programmes, and the implementation of the Pan Africa e-Network project.

India has also offered numerous capacity building and training programmes to African countries such as: the ITEC, ICCR, CV Raman Scientific Fellowships, Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP), and Technical Cooperation Scheme (TCS) of Colombo Plan schemes, Special Agricultural Scholarships, Short-term specialised training programmes, and distance learning through Pan Africa e-Network.

The areas of training and capacity building covered by these programmes are crucial because of their respective role in sustaining the region to attain the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development as they cover the key development areas like: IT, renewable energy, agriculture, marine and aeronautical engineering, marine hydrography, SME entrepreneurship, rural development, parliamentary affairs, logistics and management, climate change adaptation, disaster management, cyber security, forensic sciences, and defence and security.

**Conclusion**

India is supporting development in Africa through four major modalities: capacity building and training, lines of credit (LoC), grant assistance, and bilateral trade and investments. Africa’s exports to India remain essentially concentrated in crude oil and primary commodities, while India’s exports to Africa are more diversified and include manufactured and technological-content products. Bilateral investment flows have also improved considerably in the last decade. Africa’s resource endowments and energy security concerns in India have also stimulated Overseas Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI).

This study finds that Indian investment in Africa is concentrated mostly in natural resource industries, textiles, information and communications technology, banking and automotive industries. We underline that the remarkable growth of trade and investment in the last two decades between India and Africa is explained by the deepening of their bilateral economic and political ties that have been proved by numerous initiatives, summits and partnership agreements.

African countries are the primary beneficiary of Indian development assistance through LoCs and grant assistance. India has extended 186 lines of credit to 42 African countries for a total amount of nearly US$10.493 billion during the time period 2002-2019.

Sharing developmental experiences and transferring technical capabilities have also characterised the India-Africa development cooperation that have taken many modalities of partnership such as: bilateral capacity-building programme, training and education scholarships.
Agenda 2030 and the Agenda 2063 as proposed by the African Union call for extensive efforts for their realization. In order to enable African countries to attain them, it is recommended that India intensify specifically the development cooperation programmes that focus on creating and strengthening existing technological capacities, and sharing of developmental experiences and knowledge with Africa. In this context, we recommend specifically the following measures:

• Increasing the number of scholarships allocated to African countries under the ICCR, the ITEC programmes and the CV Raman fellowships, especially for Sub-Saharan countries.
• Increasing the coverage of Pan Africa e-network to include more participant universities and medical institutions.
• Playing a more central role in promoting digital transformation in Africa, by increasing both financial and technical assistance to IT infrastructures, IT parks, and financial digitalization projects.
• Increasing institutional support for the development of SMEs in Africa by expanding the number of vocational training centres and business incubators to share/transfer the Indian knowledge and experience, and promoting the linkages between SMEs on both sides.
• Increasing India’s engagement in building scientific and technological human capital in Africa by increasing the number of linkages agreements between higher education institutions in Africa and India.
• Increasing grant assistance and knowledge sharing in health issues to affected African countries by deadly spreading diseases like Ebola, HIV, Malaria, etc.

Endnotes
1 See: https://mea.gov.in/Images/attach/ANNEXURE_111_Lu3245.pdf
3 Total assistance provided by India to foreign countries annually in the last ten years. See: https://mea.gov.in/Images/attach/ANNEXURE_1_Lu3245.pdf

References


Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations support to South-South and triangular cooperation SSC/17/3 (2012). Note by the Secretary-General, New York.

High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation Seventeenth session. (May 2012).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total United Nations</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>206.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>United Nations Organization (18%)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (51%)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (60%)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Health Organization (76%)</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7%)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>World Food Programme (100%)</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization (60%)</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Industrial Development Organization (100%)</td>
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<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (33%)</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Development Programme (100%)</td>
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<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
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<td>Total regional development banks</td>
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<td>21.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
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Introduction

It is obvious that the economic development in the South world could not be separated from the role of China and India. Since 2015, China has been running the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to make more global influence and contribution to the international economy. The initiative covers cooperation with developing countries in Asia as well as in Africa by providing them loans or aids for infrastructure developments and proper access for trade. India, collaborating with Japan in 2017, established the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). Similar to BRI, the aim of AAGC is to establish an industrial and economic network from East Asia to Africa across the Indo-Pacific region.

Regarding the rise of China, it is obvious that the country has been engaging with the global economy since opening-up of its own economy in 1979 and joining WTO in 2001. The country also has become an economic partner for many countries in the world. Having positive trend in its GDP growth for decades, China seeks to maintain its economic might. Thus, in 2013 President Xi Jinping introduced the Belt and Road Initiative and in 2015 it was implemented through the Chinese government’s action plan known as BRI or One Belt One Road. The initiative focuses on enhancing cooperation in the global economy (Huang, 2016) by addressing countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe as well. Furthermore, BRI has five priorities and concerns: policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, trade, financial integration and people to people relations (BRF, 2017).
Meanwhile, the establishment of AAGC by India and Japan specifically focuses on Africa. India, in particular, has already had close relations with African countries in terms of historical perspective (Dubey, 2016) and current economic developments. For many years, many African, as well as Asian, countries enjoyed technical assistance and scholarships provided by India aiming to increase their economy (Trigunayat, 2019). At the same time, Japan also becomes an investor and provides development assistance for many countries in the South (Shimomura, Page, & Kato, 2016). Therefore, the AAGC announced at the African Development Bank summit held at Gandhinagar, India in 2017 is intended to attain a closer relationship with Africa (PMIndia, 2017).

However, as many compare between BRI and AAGC, some critical ideas rise whether both compete against each other. Most critics maintain that the AAGC is an agenda to balance the China’s BRI. The arguments not only come from politicians but also from scholars. On the other hand, countries in the South are seeking to achieve economic development. While cooperation among countries is an important factor, investments and assistance from the rising powers constitute an alternative to the developed countries. This paper discusses the current development agendas, particularly in the realm of the South-South Cooperation (SSC), and how the issue could have political contests.

As for the structure of this paper, this introduction is followed by a discussion on the progress of BRI and AAGC in the next section. The discourses on the competition between both agendas will be elaborated. The following section will then discuss some common social and economic issues in the South. In this regard, the section aims to demonstrate that both BRI and AAGC could be the cross-alternative solution to address the issues faced by developing countries. The concluding section traces the trend and possibilities of engagement between both programs, emphasising on a positive discourse in line with the ideals embedded in SSC.

**Political and Competing Agendas?**

When President Xi initiated the BRI, its aim was to reinstate the two ancient silk roads. The first is the land-based road connecting China to Europe known as ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ covering Central and Western Asia (Li, Qian, Howard, & Wu, 2015). The second one is the maritime routes linking China to other Asian region, Africa, and Europe and now it is known as the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ (Lim, 2015). In this case, the BRI covers roughly 63 per cent of world’s population and one-third of global GDP (Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018).

In November 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initiated AAGC. It was to promote social and economic development, connectivity, capacity building, and infrastructure development in the area of Indo-Pacific. Yet, Africa in this case is the main focus of the agenda not only because of the historical relations but also Africa’s economic development that is expected to be one of the fastest growing economies. With the rise of Asia, AAGC moves with the purpose of inter-regional cooperation between Asia and Africa, in general.
A couple of months later on 14-15 May, 2017, many countries participated in the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. While Japan also took part in this event, India did not attend; speculated as no acceptance. This belief becomes stronger when a few days after the event on 22-26 May 2017, AAGC was firstly announced in the African Development Bank summit in Gandhinagar. Many assumptions were on the rise to argue that the AAGC is a counter-balancing agenda against BRI, particularly due to the focused region of AAGC in Asia and Africa overlapping some of BRI countries.

This kind of argument is voiced by some scholars. The AAGC is not just similar to the Chinese initiative but aimed to compete it (Zongyi, 2017). Japan and India are believably putting forward their agenda in a general extent to confront the Chinese initiative (Dekai, 2018). Meanwhile, Gabriel and Carvalho (2018) assert that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ term in AAGC leads to a clear geo-strategic competition with BRI. Yet, the AAGC is a soft balancing strategy since it employs economic development agenda without any military means. The importance of balancing is a crucial necessity in the way of foreign policy behaviour. The AAGC is India and Japan’s attempt to anticipate the aggressiveness of China in the backdrop of BRI (Joshi, 2017). From this point, the AAGC is arguably a counter reaction toward the BRI. Indeed, both India and Japan could emphasise their status that they intend to bear their responsibility for global development (MOFA, 2016) and do not want to counter any country (India Today, 2018).

Nevertheless, we should notice several considerations. First, both AAGC and BRI are not in the means of military realm. Instead, the initiators are running their agendas in the economic trajectory in a vigorous way of cooperation with countries in the South. When there is no military purpose, the economic competition could deliver positive implication, not only as rapid economic growth (The Economist, 2018) but also for poverty reduction (Godfrey, 2008; Nellist & Preston, 2007).

Second, while in some aspect BRI and AAGC are similar, both have different characteristics. According to Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi, AAGC is a distinctive initiative featuring a consultative process. It does not only address trade and economy but is also important for bringing to the forefront centrality of African people. Moreover, the presence of Japan as the major partner could deliver the quality of infrastructure for the involved parties (Nair, 2017).

Cross-Alternative Solution and Bargaining for Developing Countries

As discussed earlier, competition could be beneficial for participating countries in Asia and Africa as it provides with more choices. The needs of developing countries are complex, as some face the challenges of corruption and poor governance (Aladwani, 2016; Gong & Scott, 2016; Khan, 2017), while others face illiteracy, health-related challenges or other sectoral-specific issues (Gilbert, Patel, Farmer, & Lu, 2015; Matasci, 2017; Woolcock, 2018). Moreover, neither of these challenges operate in isolation and often get compounded in some countries.

The technical assistants provided by China, India, and Japan are extremely useful for improving human resources in the South. Human resources in this case
are an important factor for social and political development because they will be a long-term asset for their countries. It may also commonly be known that education particularly in African countries, is still low. In fact, they need to improve their lives and economy. When the people are well educated, countries will have a promising future.

At the same time, BRI and AAGC lead the countries in the South to have more bargaining power in deciding with whom they want to be integrated. The two agendas from different rising powers have their own features, benefits as well as risks. Any country could choose and possibly negotiate either with China or India (and Japan), depending upon their needs and the offers. Subsequently, this will lead to positive social and economic development.

AAGC offers development experience and greater economic development between Asia and Africa as two big regions. Enhancing prosperity and freedom of development plans are also parts of the features (Prakash, 2018). Similarly, the BRI holds out financial aids and mostly for infrastructure for economic accessibility.

So far neither the BRI nor AAGC sets a conditional rule in the way denying against another initiative. For example, China does not require the BRI’s participating countries to reject their participation in AAGC and vice versa. In this case, developing countries could decide to have more channels to develop. Since both agendas may have different concerns, the countries in the South enjoy cross alternative solution from the two sides. Some issues that are not covered by the BRI can be tackled with the India-Japan led-initiative. Similarly, the BRI could become solution, for example, for infrastructure investments and financial loans that may not be handled by the AAGC.

**Conclusion: The Future Trend**

It is promising that both BRI and AAGC could assist the countries in the South toward proper economic development. When some argue that the two agendas are competing against each other, this paper attempts to give alternative explanation that the case should not be understood as a conflicting issue. Instead, the BRI and AAGC could bring more benefits for other developing countries as cross-alternative for socio-economic issues. Moreover, they also would have more bargaining position since they have more options to cooperate with.

One may expect that both the China and India and Japan’s initiatives could run in the same route bringing stronger and more positive growth. China’s statement toward AAGC sounds positive since the government welcome India to engage in the BRI (Zongyi, 2017). Furthermore, recent India’s foreign policy shows admiring behaviour. Although India did not participate in the BRI forum in 2017, its participation as a full member in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the early 2018 signals closer relations with China.

Indeed, this assumption might be too early especially as the world politics is too dynamic. Whether the BRI and AAGC could work together or in the same platform depends on how the China-India and China-Japan relations run. The borders as well as ideological issues might become some of the obstacles. Nevertheless if both sides are concerned more about the importance of South-South Cooperation, the problems should be tackled appropriately.
References


Afghanistan has been embroiled in one form of turmoil or the other in the past four decades, be it the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979 or the seizing of power by the Taliban in 1996. These bitter realities have utterly debilitated the social fabric and the political structures that Afghans held afloat for long and wreaked havoc on all the major developmental efforts by putting a screeching halt on them. As a result, the shattered Afghan dream of peace was certainly enervated but not destroyed. The cradle of hope could be attributed to many international actors who positively contributed to the reconstruction of the country, both in blood and treasure, especially post the decimation of the Taliban. One such partner has been India, to which Afghans refer to as an “all-weather friend.” India has been on the up and up in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans as it walked the talk of its belief in democracy by building the National Assembly of Afghanistan, building the Afghan-India Friendship Dam (AIFD), formerly Salma Dam, and in enriching social complex by building two cricket stadiums in Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif.

Parliament Building
India’s Central Public Works Department completed the construction of the Parliament Building for Afghanistan in 2015 at the cost of Rs. 969 crore. It was inaugurated by the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on December 25, 2015. It is constructed to withstand terrorist attacks and earthquakes up to 8.0 on the Richter scale.

“...it is not an overstatement to reckon India’s role in Afghanistan’s developmental efforts as indispensably consequential, without which much of extant progress made would remain longing”.

*Charge’ de’Affaires, Embassy of Afghanistan, New Delhi and Co-Chairperson IAF (India-Afghanistan Foundation)
**Salma Dam Power Project**

The rechristened Afghan-India Friendship Dam in Herat Province on the Hari River was inaugurated by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani on 4 June 2016. The project constitutes the construction of a 107 meters high earth and rock-fill dam and a 42-MW powerhouse with three units of 14 MW each. Further, the project also included releasing water for irrigation of 75,000 ha of land. A central public-sector unit under the Indian Ministry of Water Resources, WAPCOS, executed this project in 2006 at the cost of Rs. 1775.69 crore. It has culminated in the overall development of Western Afghanistan with accessible and reliable water and power supply. Besides, this project is intended to irrigate the fields of more than six hundred and forty villages.

Further, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) has been offering 1,000 scholarships per annum to Afghan students since 2003, the largest scheme for any country run by ICCR. As a corollary, 60,000 Afghan students have graduated from India since fall of the Taliban and 16,000 studying currently. India’s support to the peace and harmony of war-torn Afghanistan has witnessed India’s steadfast commitment in the form of military assistance. For instance, in 2019 India gifted 6 Mi-24V helicopters to Afghanistan, boosting the capability of the Afghan forces. Additionally, India is also the largest export destination of Afghanistan, and as a result, the bilateral trade is estimated to reach $2 billion by 2020. The exhibitions like Passage to Prosperity and India International Trade Fair have constantly been maneuvering-laden apertures for Afghan traders to exhibit, interact, sell, and establish nexus for their prospective business deals, which culminate in massive contracts and MoUs being signed every year. For instance, in Passage to Prosperity Trade Show, 2018 in Mumbai, $27 million in contracts for agricultural products and over $214 million worth of Memorandums of Understanding between Afghan vendors and Indian buyers were signed. Furthermore, India’s development of Chabahar port in the Sistan-Balochistan province of energy-rich Iran’s southern coast helped massively cutting the transport costs/time for trade transit which is connected to the Zaranj-Delaram road constructed by India in 2009. In keeping with India’s doubling down trade gambit, circumventing issues arising because of road transits, various air freight corridors have been opened helping Afghan businesses to leverage India’s economic growth and trade networks for its benefit.

**Air Freight Corridors**

India and Afghanistan established the first air corridor between Kabul and New Delhi in June 2017, carrying 100 tonnes of cargo. Further, the corridors have been expanded to connect Mumbai, Kolkata, Amritsar, Hyderabad with Kabul and Kandahar. The aim of this scheme was to free Afghanistan’s reliability from the Pakistan’s restricting and hampering the India-bound trade. By the time the second corridor was launched, 10,640 tonnes of freshly produced and dried fruits, medicinal plants and handicrafts worth more than US $20 million had been exported to India. Furthermore, under the SAFTA agreement signed among the SAARC members, Afghan exports are exempted from any Indian custom duties.
and tariffs, boosting trade even more. More than 250 cargo flights have been exchanged between Afghanistan and India from Kabul and Kandahar, and more than 4000 tonnes of products, including 900 tonnes of fresh fruits, have been exported to India from Afghanistan so far.

Zaranj-Delaram Highway

Former President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai and Former President of India Pranab Mukherjee inaugurated a 218-km Zaranj-Delaram Highway on 22 January 2009, providing connectivity to the Southwestern Afghanistan to Iran. It has opened a new trade and transit corridor, which is connected to the Chabahar Port. Additionally, Indian construction team built 58 km of inner-city roads. The total project cost amounted to US $150 million. It has further reduced the time travel between Zaranj and Delaram to two hours from 12-14 hours earlier.

India’s proactive engagement in conducting various capacity-building programmes is commensurately glaringly obvious to Afghan people, where India is offering a slot for training 500 Afghan civil servants every year. Besides, India also conducted a capacity-building programme for Afghan immigration Officials in 2019 through ITEC, where the programme covered modules pertaining to immigration, entry requirements of host countries, security features of various travel documents, and so on.

In conjunction with all these above-mentioned programmes, India has also stressed for gender equality and women empowerment and considered them as intrinsic and essential elements for the success of the peace process in Afghanistan. Various India NGOs are working with the women in Afghanistan and providing vocational training in areas of food processing, garment stitching, embroidery, et cetera. One such example of Indian NGO is Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), funded by the USAID, which is working vigorously for the upliftment and self-reliance of Afghan women by running various training programmes.

All of this has been transforming Afghanistan from being an aid-recipient country to an invaluable trade partner, from being labeled as a land-locked country to a land-bridged country providing vital access to Central Asia, from being a land that infamously barred women from attending school under the Taliban regime to an increasingly visible women-led civil societies, businesses, and government institutions. Thus, it is not an overstatement to reckon India’s role in Afghanistan’s developmental efforts as indispensably consequential, without which much of extant progress made would remain longing.
Amika Bawa*

“The First African South-South Cooperation Report, UNDP-NEPAD”


Available at https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/first-african-south-south-cooperation-report.html

“Another feature that stands out in the report, and very often the true outcome of surveys, is the sharing of good practices, which can also help in strengthening localisation efforts and showcase commitments towards international goals.”

Two calendar years, 2030 and 2063, mark the timeline for global targets towards achieving sustainable development and regional targets towards creating a unified Africa. To meet these commitments, South-South Cooperation (SSC) complementing the traditional approaches to development cooperation has emerged as a key modality. SSC, a southern-led approach, centres on empowering developing countries to not just take ownership of their development trajectories but also become providers of development based on its principle of solidarity. In the case of the African continent, SSC has worked to foster engagements that allow for context-specific solutions, innovative ways of doing development and sowed the seeds for countries to enhance their traditional knowledge systems and national capacities. Recognising the growing role of SSC comes the First African South-South Cooperation Report supported by the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), using data

* Research Assistant, RIS.
provided by nine African countries. It sheds light on the achievements of African countries and articulates a way forward for future partnerships for development, in line with the continent’s priorities and commitments.

Divided into three chapters, the first part of the Report focuses on the institutionalisation of SSC in Africa and efforts towards it. The second chapter draws upon the nature of partners and SSC projects contributing towards Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. The third and final chapter reflects upon the need for scaling up SSC, in light of establishing reporting mechanisms, enhancing innovative approaches and moving towards triangulation of efforts. This review systematically presents the essence of each chapter, while simultaneously engaging on some pressing issues facing Southern cooperation.

Building Blocks of SSC

The report begins by providing a bird’s eye view of all institutional mechanisms at play for strengthening SSC at the global level, inter - and intra-regional level, and national level before it delves into the mechanisms for promoting and achieving Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want. In doing so it showcases, albeit briefly, the SSC ecosystem that has been created since the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), 1978 unfolding the complexities of overlapping agenda and agreements, forums and platforms, all directed towards the ultimate goal of sustainable development.

At the global level, as expressed in the report, SSC aims to promote the flow of knowledge and resource for development in line with the development goals and priorities of the Southern countries. It begins by highlighting the commitments made at BAPA 1978 for strengthened SSC and trails a timeline of its institutionalisation. International frameworks such as United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio+20 (2012), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015) and Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (2015) are noted as being the torchbearers of SSC in Africa, having explicit mention of Southern cooperation and carrying forward the core objectives of BAPA. Additionally, structures such as Forum on Financing for Development, Development Cooperation Forum and United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) along with its inter-agency mechanism for SSC and triangular cooperation (TrC) constitute the institutional architecture.

The report also asserts on the need to mainstream SSC in the existing structures in Africa, while cross-regional and continental efforts such as the BRICS, IBSA, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Free movement of people (ECOWAS) are underway. A distinct mechanism that is highlighted in this section is the role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that form the ‘building blocks’ for the African Union and take forward the frameworks and agendas for development so far.

The report draws attention to Africa’s institutional approach towards achieving its 2063 goals through the mechanism of SSC. African countries, like other countries of the South face the double pressure of being responsible development actors at the international level while simultaneously facing development
challenges at home. The report, reflecting on the double challenge of development highlights the unique indigenous structures and mechanisms that work in tandem with international organisations, allow for the absorption of international models of development while also share home-grown solutions.

The report also attempts to explain the evolution of institutional mechanisms in African countries identifying a two-step approach. The first step is identified in countries where operational units (such as in Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti) or agencies (such as in South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Rwanda) have been set up that are working towards articulating coherent SSC strategies and approaches in Africa. The second step is more normative in nature with respect to the articulation of laws, establishment of funds, and setting up of networks to implement the SDGs. In some countries, the two approaches may occur simultaneously, while in some it is more incremental.

One overarching challenge of SSC has been the regional differences in defining southern cooperation. However, this has not hindered the sprouting of agencies that recognise the diversity and plurality of SSC yet aspire to work together to have common modalities, research priorities and even accounting and assessment mechanisms. The first chapter closes with this recognition of the potential of SSC for Africa to become a ‘master of its own destiny (p. 29)’.

**Nexus of Modalities of Southern Cooperation**

It is essential to note that SSC is not a linear approach to development, rather it has multiple modalities working in tandem towards sustainable development having a cross-sectional and cross-sectoral impact. Such a perspective has been articulated by India’s Development Compact approach that seeks to ensure all-round development in a partner country (Chaturvedi 2016, p. 50). The second chapter of the report acknowledges this complexity in SSC, as it draws data from nine countries namely, Benin, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Sudan and Uganda, and makes a noteworthy effort to showcase the 300 initiatives carried out by these countries (surveyed in 2017) under the SSC umbrella.

The survey findings indicate a dominance of technical cooperation (203 initiatives) over economic cooperation (97 initiatives) and further, within technical cooperation the noted favoured modes of cooperation were sharing of technology, multi-component support and trainings. The most active African countries in undertaking pan-African initiatives were South Africa, Uganda, Kenya and Zimbabwe, and key non-African SSC providers have been Brazil, India, China, South Korea, Turkey, and UAE. The results show that projects directed towards employment generation, industry and infrastructure had a preference in the project landscape, closely followed by projects dedicated to health, education, food security and poverty. The lack of information, lack of coordination in the institutional architecture and the lack of a common definition emerged as the major challenges in gathering data on SSC, as noted in the report.

Given the interdependency of modalities of SSC, an initiative often has multiple points of impact bringing qualitative changes in sectors and actors.
often beyond the targeted receivers. While the report presents a gathering of data and analysis on efforts of the South, a wholesome picture of the impact of SSC will become evident with complementary studies taking on a multi-modality and qualitative lens to distinctly understand the impact of SSC initiatives towards the achievement of the inter-linked sustainable development goals.

**Making Efforts Meet - Integrating TrC with NSC and SSC**

The third chapter of the report makes a proposal for triangular cooperation (TrC) as a way to accelerate SSC in Africa, working towards bridging knowledge, capacity and resource gaps. It begins with the study of the monitoring and reporting platform of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) for development cooperation. The Ibero-American Database System on South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SIDICSS) is presented as a best practice towards curating data on SSC programmes with the value addition of cross-checking the data, and as a step towards enhancing Africa potential for intra-regional engagement, beginning with data management. Another Pan-African initiative that is discussed is the Islamic Development Bank’s innovative reverse linkage mechanism.

On Triangular Cooperation (TrC), the report adopts the definition of TrC articulated in the Nairobi Outcome Document (2009) focusing on the support provided by developed countries and formation of partnerships based on ‘development purposes’ (p. 51). For the African continent, the report emphasises on the need for TrC, complementing North-South and South-South cooperation, based on the comparative advantages of partners. It further acknowledges the role of multilateral agencies such as development banks, UN agencies or even regional groupings such as the RECs as facilitating triangulation. The report takes the opportunity to promote TrC in the First African South-South Cooperation Report as a modality to ‘improve and broaden the development landscape (p. 56)’ efforts of the continent.

**First of Many to Come**

In articulating the role of SSC and TrC as a mechanism for enhanced development interventions, the report highlights the returns partnerships have obtained be it in terms of bridging knowledge, expertise, financial resources or technology gaps. The survey provides a look at what sectors and modalities are favoured and who are the trendsetters on the continent. The cases of SEGIB and IsDB seek to accelerate SSC through triangulation of efforts, setting new pathways for cooperation. A well-documented effort at studying SSC in Africa, the report traces how SSC has grown since 1978 and where is it headed. For the many to come, the reports themselves will be an effort towards accounting/reporting of SSC while assessment templates continue to develop through deliberations at forums such as the Delhi Process Conferences and High-Level policy platforms.

It should be noted that while stakeholders are deliberating on assessment templates, the narrative and its outcome should emerge from the South to ensure sustainability in efforts and reporting mechanisms. From 1978 to 2019 various agreements lay down expectations for the capturing of data in
SSC for effective development. The report, inspired by the reporting mechanism of the SEGIB, continues to focus on the need for accounting and reporting over assessment. To bring in a discussion on assessment, the narrative should emerge from ground-up with an element of solidarity and voluntary assessment of impact that is foundational to the process of development for Africa. The expectations, as articulated at BAPA, BAPA+40 and even Agenda 2030, should not become a limitation to the sharing of the richness of SSC and not be read as obligations for countries to establish such mechanisms.

Another feature that stands out in the report, and very often the true outcome of surveys, is the sharing of good practices, which can also help in strengthening localisation efforts and showcase commitments towards international goals. The sharing of traditional and local know-how can encourage countries to partake in similar initiatives, tailoring them based on their demand. The four text boxes that reflect upon such good practices are the Poverty-Environment initiative of the Rwanda-UNDP-UN Environment partnership for setting up green villages; cooperation between Cuba and Kenya to provide medical specialists to build capacities of Kenyan doctors; mapping of resource centres in Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey; and rural electrification in Mali.

The report provides the initial glimpse into these good practices; however, the South as a whole is known for its indigenous and unique ways of doing things. Some such unique ways are an outcome of domestic efforts to tackle development challenges (such as the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda for reconciliation and ensuring sustainable peace) while some are the outcome of ongoing SSC efforts that have required tailored approaches. Noting that this is the first of many reports, subsequent efforts can bring out such practices showcasing the true resources – knowledge and home-grown solutions – embedded in the African continent.

Endnotes

References
DAC (Development Assistance Committee) member countries agreed in 1970 to provide 0.7 per cent of their GNI (Gross National Income)\(^1\) as official aid to developing and the least developed countries for their development\(^2\). In the present issue we look at the empirical status of such a pledge which in the present context captures the promise made by the DAC members to contribute annually as ODA. It is observed that ODA (Official Development Assistance) from all DAC members together as percentage of GNI of the DAC countries never reached the pledged amount between 1970 and 2018. It hovered around 0.27 per cent of GNI throughout the last five decades of development cooperation. It is important to note that the gap or shortfall between pledged and delivered ODA from 1970 till 2018 is measured to be USD 6.1 trillion. Figure 1 shows that shortfall of ODA from the DAC member countries increased from USD 56.1 billion in 1970 to

**Figure 1: Gap between ODA Disbursement and Shortfall, 1970-2018 (US$ billion)**

Source: Author’s calculation, based on the data from OECD stat.

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\(^{1}\) GNI

\(^{2}\) Development

* Consultant, RIS
USD 186.1 billion in 2018 (at constant 2017 prices). In other words, if DAC member countries had consistently met the 0.7 per cent target since 1970, the developing countries would have been supported with another USD 6.1 trillion (this amount is equal to the cumulative GNI (at constant 2017 prices) of 36 countries from 1970 to 2018). The amount would have made massive differences, in terms of designing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Figure 2: Estimated Cumulative ODA Shortfall, 1970-2018

Figure 2 looks at country wise cumulative ODA shortfall from 1970 to 2018. As is clear, the largest shortfall has been recorded the by USA with Japan, Germany, UK and France (Figure 2) following in the order. Shortfall of cumulative ODA from these five countries together has been USD 4.83 trillion accounting for more than 78 per cent of total pledged cumulative ODA during the period under review. It is also important to note that only USA accounted more than 45 percent of cumulative shortfall in pledged ODA from 1970 to 2018.

In reality ODA is better measured by its actual disbursement. Data from OECD also captures the extent of commitment of ODA. As per OECD/DAC website, commitment of ODA is firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds undertaken by the DAC member countries to the recipients and actual disbursement is the amount released as ODA. In this section we look into the ratio between actual disbursement and commitment and that between actual disbursement and pledged amount. A value of the ratio above 100 represents an excess of disbursement over the variable at the denominator. Total ODA disbursement by all DAC member countries between 1970 to 2017 (the latest year for which data is available), amounted to US$ 3852.53 billion (based on constant prices 2017), compared with total commitments of US$ 4621.18 billion in the same time period, which represents about 83.37 per cent of disbursement-to-commitment ratio.

Figure 3 shows the ratio of disbursement-to-commitment ODA (%) and ratio of disbursement-to-pledged ODA (%) of nine selected countries (USA, UK, Germany, France, Japan, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) over the time 1970-2017.
Figure 3 shows that Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark have high disbursement-to-commitment and disbursement-to-pledged ODA ratio while USA and Japan recorded the low disbursement-to-pledged ODA ratio between 1970 to 2017. UK’s disbursement-to-pledged ODA ratio increased from 34.1 per cent in 2000 to 99.9 per cent in 2017. Disbursement-to-commitment ratio for Germany and France hovered between 76 percent and 78 per cent over the time period 1970 to 2017.

Figure 3: Official Development Assistance Flows from DAC Countries (at Constant Prices 2017)

Source: Author’s calculation, based on the data from OECD stat.

Source: Author’s calculation, based on the data from OECD stat.
Source: Author’s calculation, based on the data from OECD stat.
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Endnotes
1 Initially the commitment of ODA was 0.7 percent of GDP later it changed to GNI.
2 See UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970, paragraph 43.
4 (ODA disbursement/ODA commitment)×100.
5 (ODA disbursement/ pledged ODA)×100.
6 Latest data of ODA commitment is available till 2017.
7 Average between 1970 to 2017.

References
Introduction of a Section on Peer Reviewed Articles/Essays

In keeping with suggestions, feedbacks and accumulated experience, we have decided to introduce a section, containing peer reviewed full length articles/essays. Interested scholars willing to contribute are requested to send in their manuscripts (preferably in not more than 5000 words) to the editorial office.

Call for Contributions

We invite contributions from interested readers on issues related to development cooperation in general and South-South Cooperation in particular. Contributions may also capture theory, practice and associated debates on development cooperation. Reviews of latest publications - books, monographs, reports - are also welcome. Any institutional upcoming events on development cooperation may also be captured in DCR. The contributions should be restricted to not more than 1500 words.

For editorial information, contributions, feedback and comments: mail to milindo.chakrabarti@ris.org.in and dgoffice@ris.org.in

Guidelines for Contributors

1. DCR is a refereed multi-disciplinary international journal. Manuscripts can be sent, as email attachment, in MS-Word to the Managing Editor (milindo.chakrabarti@ris.org.in).
2. Manuscripts should be prepared using double spacing. The text of manuscripts should not ordinarily exceed 1500 words. Manuscripts sent for peer review section may be limited to 5000 words. Such submissions should contain a 200 word abstract, and key words up to six.
3. Use ‘s’ in ‘-ise’ ‘-isation’ words; e.g., ‘civilise’, ‘organisation’. Use British spellings rather than American spellings. Thus, ‘labour’ not ‘labor’. (2 per cent, 3 km, 36 years old, etc.). In general descriptions, numbers below 10 should be spelt out in words. Use thousands, millions, billions, not lakh and crore. Use fuller forms for numbers and dates— for example 1980-88, pp. 200-202 and pp. 178-84. for example ‘the eighties’, ‘the twentieth century’, etc.

Reference Style: References should be appended at the end of the paper. References must in double space, and should be same author(s) is cited, then arrange them chronologically by year of publication.

All references should be embedded in the text in the APA style. For details please refer to Course and Subject Guides: https://pitt.libguides.com/c.php?g=12108&p=64730

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About Development Cooperation Review

Development Cooperation Review (DCR) aspires to capture holistic narrative around global development cooperation and fill an important knowledge gap towards theorisation, empirical verification and documentation of Southern-led development cooperation processes. Despite growing volumes of development partnerships around the Southern world, there remains an absence of detailed information, analysis and its contribution to global development processes. Even though there have been sporadic efforts in documenting some of the activities, a continuous effort in chronicling the diverse experiences in South-South Cooperation (SSC) is still absent. RIS, in joint publication with GDI, FIDC and NeST has endeavoured to launch DCR, a monthly periodical, to fill this gap.

About Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS)

RIS is a New Delhi–based autonomous policy research institute envisioned as a forum for fostering effective policy dialogue and capacity-building among developing countries on global and regional economic issues. The focus of the work programme of RIS is to promote South-South Cooperation and collaborate with developing countries in multilateral negotiations in various forums. @RIS_NewDelhi

About Global Development Initiative (GDI)

Established at RIS, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) aims to institutionalise knowledge on India’s development initiatives and promote their replication as part of knowledge sharing in Asia and Africa with the help of its institutional partners, including civil society organisations. It attempts to explore and articulate global development processes within a micro framework and works as a unique platform to collate and assimilate learning processes of other countries towards promotion of equity, sustainability and inclusively based on multi-disciplinary and multi-functional approach.

About Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST)

Knowledge generated endogenously among the Southern partners can help in consolidation of stronger common issues at different global policy fora. Consequent to the consensus reached on many of these issues at the High-Level Conference of Southern Providers in Delhi (March 2013) and establishment of the subsequent Core Group on the SSC within the UNDCF (June 2013), the Network of Southern Think-Tanks (NeST) was formally launched at the Conference on the South-South Cooperation, held at New Delhi during 10-11 March 2016. The purpose of the NeST is to provide a global platform for Southern Think-Tanks for collaboratively generating, systematising, consolidating and sharing knowledge on SSC approaches for international development. @NeST_SSC

About Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC)

FIDC aims to encourage detailed analysis of broad trends in South-South cooperation and contextualise Indian policies by facilitating discussions across various subject streams and stakeholders based on theoretical and empirical analysis, field work, perception surveys and capacity building needs. @FIDC_NewDelhi
DCR is brought out by GDI as part of cross-learning and sharing of development cooperation practices in Global South.
Ambassador’s Perspective
India-Afghanistan, a Tested and Proved Friendship
Tahir Qadiry

Book Review
The First African South-South Cooperation Report, UNDP-NEPAD
Amika Bawa

SSC Statistics
The Gap between Pledge and Action: A Case of ODA between 1970 and 2018
Sushil Kumar