

G20 Economic Policy Performance and Prospects

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John Kirton*

Abstract: When India hosts the G20 in 2023, today's profound challenges for the global economy and G20 governance will remain, in macroeconomic policy, development, health, digitalization and, above all, climate change. Since 2008 the G20 summit has coped with most such challenges separately. It has done so well in its foundational focus on finance, economics and development, but not in its newer concerns with health, digitalization and climate change. Nor has it mobilized the needed synergies among them, even in 2020 when COVID-19 made health and the economy its central concerns. Italy as host in 2021, with its priorities of people, planet and prosperity, plans to make such links. Indonesia's presidency in 2022 promises to add digitalization and an Asian touch. But it will be largely left to India's G20 presidency in 2023 to forge the full synergies between a healthy people and planet on which sustainable prosperity depends.

Introduction

When India hosts the G20 in 2023, today's profound challenges for the global economy and for its governance by the G20 will still be there in full force (Larionova and Kirton 2020; Pinaud 2020). They will be joined by others that can no longer be sidelined or delayed.

Even if COVID-19's latest wave has peaked and new ones or other pandemics have not yet arrived, effective vaccines, primary health care and universal health coverage must still be delivered to many of the world's poor people who are hard to reach (Kirton 2019).

Even if the current, unprecedentedly deep, COVID-19-created recession is over, and recovery, rebuilding and structural reform are well advanced, the legacy of the 2020 plunge into poverty and job loss will remain. Lingering for longer will be scarring effects for youth, women and the poor in the labour force and education, as they confront the digital transformation that COVID-19 suddenly accelerated with full force.

The global economy will also be awash with the unprecedented burden of fiscal consolidation, tax increases, debt repayments and defaults, inadequate development finance and rising inflation,

* Director, G20 Research Group; Email: john.kirton@utoronto.ca

interest rates and financial shocks (Dash 2020; Portanskiy, Sudakova and Larionov 2020).

The world will also need to reverse the major damage COVID-19 has done to progress toward the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as the halfway point to reach them arrives in 2023 (Steiner 2020).

Above all, compounding catastrophic climate change will have reached and surpassed critical ecological limits that the currently envisaged "green new deals" and flawed Paris Agreement regime cannot save the most severely afflicted people from. It has already become central to fiscal policy, led by the European Union's Green New Deal and similar ones from other major G20 members, including the United States, should its Congress agree. Moreover, the world's leading central bankers, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, have affirmed through their membership in the Network for Greening the Financial System, that climate change is an integral part of monetary policy too (Arnold 2020).

Since its start in 2008, the G20 summit has coped with most of such challenges separately and sometimes done so well. It did best, with its foundational focus on finance and economics, in responding to the global and European financial crises from 2008 to 2012 and preventing other ones from erupting from 2013 to 2019. It managed the debt default of Argentina when that country hosted the G20's Buenos Aires Summit in 2018. Since 2008, it slowly nurtured an economic recovery that produced growth and jobs, eventually exceeding the number that was there before the 2008 global financial crisis struck. It similarly contributed to development, especially at Seoul in November 2010, St. Petersburg in

2013, Hangzhou in September 2016 and Hamburg in July 2017.

It did less well on its expanding agenda after 2013 (Kirton 2020a, b). On health, it first focused on the deadly Ebola outbreak in 2014, and embraced chronic diseases later on. On the digital economy, it started in 2015, increasing its attention and impact since. On climate change, since its 2008 start through to the Riyadh Summit in November 2020, the G20 failed to come close to constraining the relentlessly rising greenhouse gas concentrations and the soon un-survivable global warming they create (Solikova 2020).

Above all, the G20 has failed to govern these separate subjects synergistically, to produce big and bold solutions that benefit all at once (Kirton and Warren 2020a, b). Its siloed approach continued in 2020, even as COVID-19 thrust health and the economy to the centre of its action at its first emergency summit on March 26 and its regular Riyadh Summit on November 21–22. Italy as host in 2021 plans to do better, with its focus on people, planet and prosperity. Indonesia as host in 2022 indicates it will continue these priorities, adding digitalisation and an Asian touch, but will largely focus on individual economic initiatives. It will thus be left to India, with its major power and potential, to create the synergies that will make a healthy people and planet the integrated foundation for prosperity and G20 success in 2023.

G20 Governance, 2008 to 2019

The G20 was created in 1999 at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors with the dual distinctive foundational mission of promoting financial stability and making globalisation work for all. From this focus on economics and development,

it has governed well at the summit level since the start in 2008 through 2019.

On economics and finance, it responded rapidly and successfully to the American-turned-global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009 and then prevented the regional European financial crisis from going global from 2010 to 2012 (Kirton 2013; Drezner 2015; Triggs 2018). It next prevented even a regional financial crisis from erupting from 2013 to 2019. With and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has been a full G20 participant from the start and whose executive board is controlled by the G20 members, the G20 coped with the debt default of Argentina, by providing it with an unprecedented \$57 billion in financial support in September 2018, just before it hosted the G20 summit in Buenos Aires on November 30 and December 1.

This successful governance was reflected in the G20's performance on the major dimensions of its work (see Appendix A). On macroeconomic policy, where its 476 commitments led all other subjects, its attention peaked at 42 per cent of its concluding communiqués in 2013 (Filipiuk 2020). Members quickly complied with their priority macroeconomic commitments at a high level of 80 per cent. Its performance on financial regulation was similarly strong, with compliance at 80 per cent (Nikolaeva 2019).

On development, in its first 14 summits, G20 attention in its communiqués averaged 27 per cent, to rank second after macroeconomic policy (Hallink 2019). Its 295 development commitments ranked third among all subjects, following the 350 on financial regulation, but surpassed them to take second place in at Hamburg in 2017 and at Osaka in 2019. However, compliance averaged only 69 per cent (Dobson 2020).

On health the G20's contribution was late and light (Byrd 2020). After marginal attention since 2008, it soared to devote 8.4 per cent of its communiqué to health at Brisbane in 2014. It made a second, rather prescient spike to 14 per cent at Osaka in late June 2019, six months before COVID-19 erupted in China next door. The G20 made 75 health commitments, starting in 2014, with 14 at Osaka, including one to improve public health preparedness and response through the World Health Organization (WHO). Yet compliance since 2014 was only 69 per cent.

On the digital economy, the G20's contribution came even later (Kirton and Warren 2018). It started strongly with 19 per cent of the communiqué and 48 commitments at the Hangzhou Summit in 2016, but declined to only six commitments for 6 per cent of the total at Osaka in 2019 (Williams 2020). Of its 94 digital economy commitments overall, compliance averaged only 69 per cent.

On climate change, which the G20 summit addressed from its start, its communiqué attention steadily rose only since 2015, to peak in the number of words at Hamburg and as a portion of total words at Osaka (Warren 2020). Its commitments followed a similar cadence, peaking at 9 per cent of the total at Osaka. Compliance averaged only 68 per cent, but reached 89 per cent for Osaka.

G20 Silos and Synergies

This varying G20 performance overwhelmingly arose from treating these key subjects in separate silos, rather than recognising and mobilising the synergies among them all. In the real world, as the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic dramatically showed when some lockdowns began to end and vaccines began to arrive to allow the economy to recover, health is wealth

(Kirton 2020c). And people's health and planetary health are also integrally connected. COVID-19 lockdowns caused greenhouse gas emissions to decline temporarily. Growing trees enhance human health and cool the Earth. In 2020, digitalisation created massive economic wealth for some, saved and improved lives through digital health and helped control climate change by enabling work at home, reducing flying, enhancing climate and environmental monitoring, even as it required servers to be cooled with air conditioners using fossil fuels. Yet very rarely has the G7 made such links.

A detailed analysis of the G20's links between SDG-centred development, digitalisation and climate change show this siloed separation. G20 leaders' performance on the SDGs started at Antalya, peaked at high levels at Hamburg and plunged by the Riyadh Summit in November 2020. Their performance on climate change and digitalisation followed a similar cadence, but the synergies were few and fragile, with no links made among all three subjects at the same time. However as such synergies contained within leaders' commitments do improve members' compliance with them, G20 leaders can and should move from silos to synergies at future summits, to the benefit of all.

G20 Governance amidst COVID-19 in 2020

No such synergies arose at the G20's emergency summit on March 26, 2020. It generated 47 commitments, led by 20 on health and nine on the economy and three on development, but only one referenced digitalisation and none did climate change.

Of the 47 commitments, 33 were on single subject silos, while 14

synergistically linked two subjects (but none linked three or more) (see Appendix B). Of the 14 synergistic commitments, seven promised more financing, resources and spending on health, while another committed more manufacturing capacity for this purpose. Three linked health to trade. Two noted the pandemic's economic and social harm to developing country debt. None suggested that health created wealth. One promised to "leverage digital technologies" for health.

The regular G20 Riyadh Summit on November 21–22 saw a similar emphasis on single subject silos, as COVID-19 crowded out Saudi Arabia's opening promise to have its summit give more priority to environmental subjects than any G20 summit before. Riyadh's 107 commitments were led by 14 on health. Trade took 10, macroeconomic policy nine, development seven, the environment six, and climate change and the digital economy only three each (see Appendix C).

Of the nine macroeconomic commitments, seven were siloed and only two were synergistic. One synergistic commitment did link to health, society and the environment, and the other linked to health alone. Of the seven development commitments, four were siloed and three were synergistic, with all of synergistic commitments linked to the economic subject of financing for development.

Of the 14 health commitments, 11 were siloed and only three were synergistic. All three synergistic commitments linked to development, and one added links to the economy and society as well. Of the three digital economy commitments, two were siloed, while one was synergistically linked to youth, women, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Of the three climate change commitments, two made a synergistic link to the economy or

energy, in ways seen to put the economy first (see Appendix D).

In all, on these five key traditional and expanded subjects a strong majority of 25 commitments were siloed versus 11 synergistic ones. Four of the five subjects had a majority of siloed commitments, with climate change the sole exception. Only one commitment made a trilateral link among the economy, health and the natural environment. None of these 25 commitments, nor the full set of 107 commitments, made a trilateral link among the economy, health and climate change itself, or even a bilateral one between health and climate change. Thus the Riyadh Summit left a very fragile foundation on which to build the synergistic links needed in the years ahead.

An initial indication of the prospects for improvement comes from the compliance of the G20's next three hosts with their G20 priority commitments thus far, as a measure of their durable commitment to G20 governance. On the 330 priority commitments assessed for compliance since 2008, Saudi Arabia averaged 56 per cent, Italy 68 per cent, Indonesia 59 per cent and India came first at 69 per cent. On macroeconomic policy, Saudi Arabia had 68 per cent, Italy 76 per cent, Indonesia 78 per cent and India first at 86 per cent. On financial regulation Saudi Arabia had 65 per cent, Italy 71 per cent, Indonesia 66 per cent and India first at 75 per cent. Development had Saudi Arabia 50 per cent, Italy 63 per cent, Indonesia 54 per cent, and India first at 66 per cent. Health had Saudi Arabia 58 per cent, Italy 50 per cent, Indonesia 46 per cent, and India first at 66 per cent. The digital economy had Saudi Arabia 57 per cent, Italy 57 per cent, Indonesia 44 per cent and India tied for first with 57 per cent. Climate change had Saudi Arabia 33 per cent, Italy 69 per cent, Indonesia

63 per cent and India second at 65 per cent. Thus, on all these key subjects, India always came first, save for its second place on climate change.

Italy's Plans and Prospects in 2021

As G20 host in 2021, Italy plans and promises to do much better at its Rome Summit on October 30–31 in building the future global economy on the foundations of a healthy people in a healthy planet, connected by digitalisation in a synergistic way. The Rome Summit will compensate for the modest results of the G20's Riyadh Summit and build on the future-oriented foundation from the G7 summit hosted by the United Kingdom on June 11–13, 2021. The Rome Summit will take place immediately before the UN's delayed and long-awaited global climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland, on November 1–12. Rome will be the first G20 summit hosted by Italy, a core member of the G7 and the European Union since their start. It brings G20 hosting back to a major democratic power, whose vast Mediterranean coastline puts it at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Atlantic world.

The Rome Summit will be hosted by Italy's new prime minister Mario Draghi. It will be infused with fresh energy from several new leaders, led by U.S. president Joe Biden who took office on January 20, 2021. It will welcome a new German chancellor, due to succeed the G20's all-time veteran Angela Merkel in October 2021. Japan's prime minister Yoshihide Suga will attend his first in-person G20 summit, after his first outing at the virtual Riyadh Summit and will arrive after hosting the Tokyo Olympics in the summer of 2021. These climate-committed newcomers will be joined by many experienced G20 veterans.

These leaders will focus on Italy's priority pillars of "People, Planet, Prosperity," presented by then Prime Minister Conte in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 2020. Those priorities included the traditional core subject of the economy, but highlighted the newer ones of health and climate change. For the first time ever, health and the environment came first, with healthy people and a healthy planet as the central cause of the sustainable, inclusive and now resilient economy the leaders wish to build.

As elaborated by the Italian G20 presidency on December 1, 2020 these three pillars highlighted five key subjects. First came the priority of addressing COVID-19, by "ensuring a swift international response to the pandemic," providing "equitable, worldwide access to diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines and building up resilience to future health-related shocks." Second came commerce, covering livelihoods, economies, and trade, aiming, as indicated in July, "on a resilient, inclusive and sustainable economic recovery" from the pandemic (AKI 2020). Third came climate change, including green growth, renewable energy and the environment. Fourth came social cohesion, embracing inequality, women's empowerment, youth, vulnerable people, jobs, social protection and food security. Fifth came connectivity, through closing the digital divide and bringing digitalisation to all.

In a reversal of Saudi Arabia's year in 2020, Italy in 2021 started with a bad pandemic and economy, which should get progressively better, as vaccinations roll out. More money will flow to finance a redesigned economic rebuilding, as the European Union starts its multi-trillion dollar, multiyear spending package and the U.S. adds it \$1.9 trillion

one. President Biden's administration, taking office on January 20 with high experience and strong economic, medical and environmental expertise, immediately emphasized controlling not just COVID-19 but also climate change through digital connectivity and international cooperation. The one thing certain to be much worse in 2021 is climate change.

The Italian presidency thus emphasized that the economic recovery must be more inclusive, greener and smarter, with a cross-cutting green agenda. The G20's central finance track accordingly sought a transformative economic recovery that was healthier, greener, digitized, more inclusive and backed by reformed multilateralism. It considered several initiatives.

The first was a G20 early warning mechanism that included economic, health and environmental risks. This would enhance pandemic preparedness for those sure to come in future years. The second initiative was a more coordinated action plan, emphasising digital platforms to enhance productivity growth and finance investments for growth. The third was shock-resilient, sustainable traditional and digital green infrastructure, including in transportation and urban areas and using nature-based solutions and creative ways to finance this. The fourth initiative was making sustainable finance integral to financial stability, including by having central banks promote climate change control and environmental enhancement. The fifth was improving financial inclusion by focusing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and their digital finance and awareness.

The sixth initiative was sustainable, progressive environmental taxation that

would steadily increase. This involved eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, increasing all forms of carbon taxation to decarbonize the global economy as quickly as possible, and using some of these revenues to retrain workers for new jobs. It could be a highlight of the Italian presidency.

Yet in bringing these priorities and initiatives to life, Italy and its G20 supporters knew that they faced several constraints. The first was debt, where more participants increasingly questioned the high and soaring deficits and debts, even as leading economists such as Larry Summers argued that the advanced economies could accommodate much more debt (Yang 2020). The second constraint was China, which was breaking the World Trade Organization's trade rules and thus remained reluctant to reform them in the desired way. The third was raising the needed resources for the IMF and to reach the SDGs.

The fourth constraint was vaccine nationalism, as the United States and other G7 members rushed to give their initial limited supply exclusively to their own citizens first. Italy sought to convince all that vaccinating poor people and countries would enable them to rejoin the economy and be a great growth stimulus.

The fifth constraint was populism. It was growing because technology and capital were relentlessly substituting for labour, thus destroying secure, well-paying middle and working class jobs and making the many losers feel that globalisation and its governance did not work for them (Oldani and Wouters 2019). This eroded the very legitimacy of both national and global governance, and the democratic principles at its core since the Cold War victory in 1989.

Indonesia's Promise and Prospects in 2022

Given Italy's ambitions and constraints, it will take more than a year to bring them to life in full. There would thus be much for the G20 to do under its Indonesian presidency in 2022.

Indonesia's planning was already underway by the summer of 2020. It initially envisaged an overall theme of "Improving Human Competitiveness and Productivity," given its government's domestic priority on these subjects. It also highlighted infrastructure development and vocational education. It asked how G20 cooperation could promote quality vocational education to improve human competitiveness and productivity, in the context of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 and how Indonesia and other emerging markets could capitalize on their demographic bonus as many developed country populations aged.

In a broader debate some suggested focusing on specific technical issues such as vocational education and delivering a concrete products such as the Global Infrastructure Hub established in 2014. The alternative, and leading view was to focus on major issue of central concern for many G20 members, set the global agenda and produce normative policy guidelines, principles and solutions for them.

By November 2020, Indonesia signalled that that it would continue Italy's priorities of people, planet and prosperity. Indonesian finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati emphasized financial inclusion and President Joko Widodo publicly highlighted the digital economy. Other priorities included trade, business, technology and multilateralism as seen in Indonesia's Association of

South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) diplomacy and global value chains and SMEs, reflecting a regional Asian approach. The 2030 Agenda SDGs might also make the list. In its process, Indonesia would probably proceed in a slow but steady way, working with the African Union and with ASEAN, whose summit Indonesia will host in 2023.

With these plans, priorities and process, Indonesia faces several constraints in delivering a highly successful, synergistic summit to meet the central challenges of 2023. Still scarred by the shock of the 1997 Asian-turned-global financial crisis, it could focus on financial self-protection, such as financial inclusion, rather than climate change and the environment, even as its current capital city of Jakarta slowly sinks. These scars and memories of the stringent conditionality for IMF financial support have created a reluctance to follow the IMF's new green agenda, with its climate and environmental conditionality for debt relief and financial support.

Moreover, Indonesia ranked low in overall and relevant specific capabilities, unless Italy's emphasis on nature-based solutions and youth would bring Indonesia's large coastlines, oceans, peatlands, forests and young population to the fore. Indonesia's capabilities are in relative decline, especially compared to its Asian neighbour China. Indonesia only became a democratic polity in 1997, much later than G20 members Korea, Mexico and Brazil. Its domestic political cohesion has been constrained by separatist threats, even as President Widodo is an experienced G20 veteran since he arrived in 2014 and faces re-election only in 2024.

Above all, Indonesia is not central to a G20 club at the hub of an expanding network of global summit governance. Indonesia had been selected to host the G20 in 2022 at a late stage, switching

with India, long scheduled to host that year. The switch, decided between the two countries, came because Indonesia, hosting ASEAN in 2023, felt it could not host both summits in a single year. This shows Indonesia's recognition of its limited institutional and financial capabilities, and its preference for the regional ASEAN summit over the global G20 one. Indonesia's ASEAN approach to its G20 presidency suggests its 2023 summit could produce highly general commitments, of limited ambition.

Moreover, Indonesia is not in the G20's leading caucus groups of the BRICS and the G7. It is a member of MIKTA – with Mexico, Korea, Turkey and Australia – but this is not a leaders-level forum. Indonesia is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Islamic Conference Organisation, but does not share membership with Italy in any summit clubs of global relevance or reach.

Indonesia's G20 summit will thus leave much for India's to do in 2023, when the COVID-19 crises will be receding and the climate emergency will take centre stage.

Conclusion: India's Prospects in 2023

India offers hope that it can indeed foster the needed ambitious, synergistic solutions, with controlling climate change at the core, at its G20 summit in 2023. Its promising prospects begin with the progress India has recently made on climate change at home and abroad, as a leader among the G20's major emerging countries (Rashmi 2020).

Moreover, India ranks well on the six key causes of summit success, specified in the systemic hub model of G20 performance (Kirton 2005; Kirton 2013).

First, India has never catalyzed or been consumed by a financial crisis or other global shock since the G20's birth in 1999. Yet it is increasingly vulnerable to climate change and deadly extreme weather events, and ranks high in cases and deaths from COVID-19.

Second, India is steadily acquiring a stronger place in the major multilateral organisations, led by the IMF and World Bank. This progress was led by the G20's breakthrough on voice and vote reform for these Bretton Woods bodies in 2010 and again for the World Bank in 2018. India is also a founding member and has been an equal host of the BRICS summit since 2009.

Third, India has relatively high and rising capabilities among G20 members, both overall and in the critical specialized capabilities needed to produce and distribute the COVID-19 vaccines.

Fourth, India has been a democracy since its independence on August 15, 1947, and has maintained its democratic character, even as some of its BRICS colleagues have moved the other way.

Fifth, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is backed by high domestic political cohesion. Since becoming prime minister in May 2014 and winning re-election in 2019, he has attended seven regular G20 summits and will probably not face re-election until 2024.

Sixth, India stands at the centre of the G20 hub of an expanding network of global summit governance. Since 1948 it has been a charter member of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting, one of the oldest plurilateral summit institutions, connecting India with the leaders of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and South Africa. As a BRICS founder, it is connected to Brazil, Russia, China and again to South Africa,

both at the annual stand-alone and G20 sideline summits every year. It has regularly participated in G7/G8 summits and been invited, along with former G20 summit hosts Australia and Korea, to the UK's G7 summit in 2021, which could create a new Democratic 10 (D10).

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Appendix A

G20 Macroeconomic Policy Performance

Year	Deliberation		Decision Making			Delivery	
	Words		Commitments			Compliance (%)	# Assessments
	#	%	#	%	Total		
2008 Washington	651	18	6	8	95	88	1
2009 London	1,713	27	15	11	129	68	1
2009 Pittsburgh	2,807	30	28	23	128	85	1
2010 Toronto	3,777	33	14	25	61	88	3
2010 Seoul	5,956	38	29	19	153	85	3
2011 Cannes	4,289	30	91	32	282	72	3
2012 Los Cabos	5,304	42	71	39	180	84	4
2013 St. Petersburg	12,200	42	66	23	281	80	3
2014 Brisbane	4,939	54	34	17	205	71	3
2015 Antalya	5,880	42	21	11	198	85	2
2016 Hangzhou	10,060	29	31	15	213	69	2
2017 Hamburg	7,964	23	40	8	529	90	1
2018 Buenos Aires	2,507	29	21	16	128	85	1
2019 Osaka	673	10	9	6	143	90	2
2020 Riyadh	3,384	60	9	6	107	Not available	
Total	72,104		485		2,832		30
Average	4,807	34	32	17	81		2

Notes: Deliberation – number of words on macroeconomic policy and the percentage of total words.

Decisions – number of commitments and the percentage of total commitments as identified by the G20 Research Group.

Delivery – compliance with priority commitments and the number of commitments assessed by the G20 Research Group.

Appendix B

G20 March 20 Emergency Summit Linked Commitments

2020-8: Coordinate on public health and **financial** measures. (health)

2020-10: [We]...seek to ensure adequate **financing** to contain the pandemic and protect people, especially the most vulnerable. (health)

2020-15: We will expand **manufacturing capacity** to meet the increasing needs for medical supplies and ensure these are made widely available, at an affordable price, on an equitable basis, where they are most needed and as quickly as possible. (health)

2020-17: We will quickly work together and with stakeholders to close the **financing** gap in the WHO Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. (health)

2020-18: We further commit to provide immediate **resources** to the WHO's COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund...on a voluntary basis. (health)

2020-19: [We further commit to provide immediate **resources** to...] the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and Innovation (CEPI)...[on a voluntary basis.] (health)

2020-20: [We further commit to provide immediate **resources** to...] Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, on a voluntary basis)...[on a voluntary basis.] (health)

2020-21: To safeguard the future, we commit to strengthen national, regional, and global capacities to respond to potential infectious disease outbreaks by substantially increasing our epidemic preparedness **spending**. (health)

2020-23: [We further commit to work together to]...leverage **digital** technologies (health)

2020-26: We commit to do whatever it takes and to use all available policy tools to minimize the economic ... damage from the pandemic (global economy)

2020-27: [We commit to do whatever it takes and to use all available policy tools to]... minimize the ... social damage from the pandemic (global economy)

2020-32: We will continue to address risks of debt vulnerabilities in low-income countries due to the pandemic. (global economy)

2020-33: Consistent with the needs of our citizens, we will work to ensure the flow of vital medical supplies, critical agricultural products, and other goods and services across borders (trade)

2020-34: [Consistent with the needs of our citizens, we will work to]...resolve disruptions to the global supply chains, to support the **health** and well- being of all people. (trade)

2020-36: Emergency measures aimed at protecting **health** will be targeted, proportionate, transparent, and temporary. (trade)

Appendix C

G20 2020 Riyadh Declaration Commitments

Issue Area	Number of Commitments	% of Commitments
Health	14	13
Crime and corruption	14	13
Trade	10	9
Macroeconomic policy	9	8
Gender	8	7
Development	7	7
Labour and employment	6	6
Financial regulation	6	6
Environment	6	6
Human rights	4	4
Energy	4	4
Climate change	3	3
Food and agriculture	3	3
Infrastructure	3	3
Digital economy	3	3
International taxation	3	3
IFI reform	2	2
Migration and refugees	1	1
International cooperation	1	1
Total	107	100

Notes: Identified and compiled by Brittaney Warren, November 22, 2020.

All commitments taken by the 2020 Leaders' Declaration, which was the only outcome document produced by the Riyadh Summit. Percentages have been rounded up.

Appendix D

G20 Riyadh Summit's Climate Change Commitments

2020-101: We endorse the Circular Carbon **Economy** (CCE) Platform, with its 4Rs framework (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle and Remove), recognising the key importance and ambition of reducing emissions, taking into account system efficiency and national circumstances. (climate change)

2020-102: In advance of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP26 in Glasgow...we reiterate our support for tackling pressing environmental challenges, such as climate change...as we promote **economic growth, energy security** and access for all, and **environmental protection**. (climate change)

2020-104: Signatories to the Paris Agreement who confirmed at Osaka their determination to implement it, once again, reaffirm their commitment to its full implementation, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances. (climate change)

Note: Synergistic links to other subjects are noted in bold.

